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PADDLING PAST NICASTRO IN THE STREAM OF 
COMMERCE DOCTRINE: INTERPRETING JUSTICE 
BREYER’S CONCURRENCE AS IMPLICITLY INVITING 
LOWER COURTS TO DEVELOP ALTERNATIVE 
JURISDICTIONAL STANDARDS 
ABSTRACT 
The Supreme Court established the stream of commerce doctrine in its 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson opinion in response to the rapid 
emergence of complex personal jurisdiction questions in products liability 
cases involving nonresident manufacturers whose products were sold and 
caused injury in U.S. forums. Although the doctrine was initially intended to 
clarify jurisdictional analysis in these cases, its application has been 
ambiguous and judicially divisive due to the Court’s chronic inability to 
explicate the quantity and quality of contacts that the doctrine requires a 
nonresident defendant to establish with a forum state before that state may 
exercise personal jurisdiction over it. 
The Court first attempted to clarify the stream of commerce doctrine’s 
application in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, which instead 
resulted in the issuance of a split decision that announced two competing 
analytical standards for determining the requisite quantity and quality of a 
nonresident defendant’s contacts with a forum state asserting jurisdiction: (1) 
the “pure stream of commerce test,” requiring only a nonresident defendant’s 
placement of its products in the stream of commerce with the expectation that 
the products will be sold in the forum state, and (2) the “stream of commerce 
plus test,” requiring evidence of a nonresident defendant’s “additional 
conduct” directed at the forum state beyond merely placing its goods in the 
stream of commerce. For nearly a quarter of a century following Asahi, lower 
courts grappled with how to apply these competing tests without any further 
guidance from the Court. 
In 2011, the Court finally made its second attempt to clarify the stream of 
commerce doctrine by granting certiorari in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. 
Nicastro. Unfortunately, the Court issued another disappointing split decision, 
prompting a torrent of law review articles conjecturing the theoretical impact 
of Nicastro and criticizing the Court for failing to provide meaningful 
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analytical guidance. In contrast, this Comment is devoted to critically 
analyzing the three patterns in which lower courts have actually responded to 
Nicastro, and it posits that although the criticism of the Court may be valid, it 
is counterproductive to moving the stream of commerce doctrine past Nicastro 
to a state of much-needed stability. 
This Comment argues that Justice Breyer structured his concurrence, 
which constitutes the holding of Nicastro under the Marks Rule, in a manner 
that enables lower courts to interpret his opinion as an implicit invitation to 
develop alternative jurisdictional approaches for the Court to survey the next 
time it grants certiorari to clarify the doctrine. Providing the Court with a 
more varied doctrinal landscape to survey has the potential to break the 
persistent analytical deadlock that caused the Court to issue split decisions in 
Asahi and Nicastro. Thus, this Comment argues that reading Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence as this implicit invitation is the only interpretation that will assist 
the Court in moving the stream of commerce doctrine past Nicastro toward the 
adoption of a stable and uniform personal jurisdiction analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court announced the stream of commerce doctrine to 
facilitate complicated personal jurisdiction analyses in complex products 
liability cases involving nonresident1 manufacturers whose products were sold 
in U.S. forum states2 and caused injury. Under the stream of commerce 
doctrine, as originally described in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson,3 a state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident 
defendant is reasonable so long as the defendant “delivers its products into the 
stream of commerce with the expectation they will be purchased by consumers 
in the forum State.”4 
Despite the Court’s simple phraseology, the actual application and 
requirements of the doctrine have remained fraught with ambiguity since its 
initial announcement in World-Wide, which should not come as a shock given 
the Court’s interminable battle in squaring a state’s exercise of personal 
jurisdiction with Fourteenth Amendment due process5 requirements more 
generally.6 
In the Court’s first foray into clarifying the stream of commerce doctrine, 
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,7 the Court issued a split, plurality 
decision that announced two analytical standards for determining the quantity 
and quality of contacts that the doctrine requires a nonresident defendant to 
establish with a forum state before that state may exercise personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant: the “pure stream of commerce” test and the “stream of 
commerce plus” test. The pure stream of commerce test only requires that a 
nonresident defendant place its products in the stream of commerce with the 
expectation that the products will be sold in the forum state asserting 
 
 1 For the purposes of this Comment, the term “nonresident” refers to an international defendant who is 
not domiciled in the U.S. forum state asserting personal jurisdiction over it in a domestic products liability 
action. 
 2 This Comment defines a “forum state” as the U.S. state in which a particular court asserting personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant is located. It will also be referred to as “state” or “forum.” 
 3 444 U.S. 286, 293–94 (1980). 
 4 Id. at 298.  
 5 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 313–16 (1945) 
(establishing that Fourteenth Amendment due process requires that a nonresident defendant has sufficient 
minimum contacts with a forum such that the state’s exercise of jurisdiction does not offend “traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice” (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 6 See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 
U.S. 714, 722 (1878). 
 7 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
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jurisdiction.8 Conversely, the stream of commerce plus test requires evidence 
of a nonresident defendant’s “additional conduct” directed at the state asserting 
jurisdiction beyond merely placing its goods in the stream of commerce.9 
Following Asahi, lower courts were forced to choose between and apply the 
case’s competing tests, resulting in the development of a significant split 
among lower courts and amplifying the analytical instability already present in 
the doctrine.10 After nearly twenty-five years of leaving lower courts to grapple 
with the application of these jurisdictional tests, the Court made its second, and 
most recent, attempt to clarify the stream of commerce doctrine by granting 
certiorari in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro.11 Yet again, the Court 
issued a split decision, reinforcing the divide between the competing tests in 
Asahi and seemingly cementing the doctrine’s analytical instability.12 
Unfortunately, as the stream of commerce doctrine has become 
progressively unstable since its announcement in World-Wide, the need for its 
stability has exponentially increased due to the dramatic growth in injuries 
caused by product defects and the subsequent rise in products liability actions. 
The number of annual injuries in the United States caused by product defects 
has grown to over 34 million.13 And as the world becomes increasingly 
globalized and interconnected, domestic and international nonresident 
manufacturers, whose products have come to these consumers through the 
stream of commerce,14 are causing a growing portion of these injuries.15 Thus, 
as the number of injuries from defective products increases in the United 
States, so does the number of difficult products liability cases involving these 
nonresident manufacturers, intensifying the need for analytical clarity and 
stability in the stream of commerce doctrine as courts endeavor to apply it on 
an increasingly regular basis. 
 
 8 Id. at 116–17 (Brenan, J., concurring). 
 9 Id. at 112 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
 10 Angela M. Laughlin, This Ain’t the Texas Two Step Folks: Disharmony, Confusion, and the Unfair 
Nature of Personal Jurisdiction Analysis in the Fifth Circuit, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 681, 703 (2009). 
 11 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 12 See id. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion). 
 13 See Clair Andre & Manuel Velasquez, Who Should Pay? The Product Liability Debate, ISSUES IN 
ETHICS, Spring 1991, http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/iie/v4n1/pay.html. 
 14 “Stream of commerce” refers to the formal and informal distribution networks manufacturers use to 
serve, directly or indirectly, the market for their products in other states.  
 15 See Daniel M. Klerman, Personal Jurisdiction and Products Liability 3 (Univ. of S. Cal. Law Sch., 
Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 143, 2012), http://weblaw.usc.edu/assets/docs/Klerman_Personal%20 
Jurisdiction.pdf. 
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In the aftermath of Nicastro, many scholars have attempted to predict the 
theoretical impact of the case and criticized the Court for failing to provide 
meaningful analytical guidance. In contrast, this Comment is devoted to 
critically analyzing the three patterns in which lower courts have responded 
and argues that although the criticism of the Court may be valid, it is 
counterproductive to moving the stream of commerce doctrine past Nicastro 
toward a state of much-needed stability. 
Part I of this Comment will create a jurisprudential context for the later 
discussion of Nicastro by providing a brief history of personal jurisdiction law 
and the besetting confusion of the stream of commerce doctrine. Part II 
presents the facts of Nicastro and evaluates the three Nicastro opinions, 
placing a particular emphasis on Justice Breyer’s concurrence, which is the 
holding of the case under the Marks Rule.16 
Finally, Part III identifies and critically analyzes the three general patterns 
in which lower courts have interpreted the Nicastro decision: (1) mistakenly 
treating the plurality as binding, (2) factually distinguishing Nicastro and 
applying the competing tests from Asahi, and (3) accepting Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence as an implicit invitation to develop alternative jurisdictional 
standards. Part III employs Smith v. Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc.,17 a 
post-Nicastro district court decision, as a case study to examine more closely 
the third response pattern—accepting Justice Breyer’s concurrence as an 
implicit invitation—in an effort to demonstrate this pattern’s significance and 
propitious implications with respect to moving jurisdictional jurisprudence past 
Nicastro. 
Ultimately, this Comment concludes that Justice Breyer’s concurrence in 
Nicastro is structured in such a way that enables lower courts to interpret its 
text and spirit as implicitly inviting them to develop alternative jurisdictional 
approaches18 for the Court to consider the next time it grants certiorari in a 
stream of commerce case to clarify the doctrine. Providing the Court with this 
 
 16 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (explaining that if “no single rationale explaining the 
result [in a case] enjoys the assent of [a majority of the Court], the holding of the Court may be viewed as that 
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds” (quoting Gregg 
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 17 840 F. Supp. 2d 927 (D.S.C. 2012). 
 18 For the purposes of this Comment, an “alternative approach” constitutes a jurisdictional standard or 
test that does not necessarily depart dramatically from traditional personal jurisdiction analyses or the Asahi 
tests, but instead applies them in a fresh or modified way, balancing the range of analytical concerns expressed 
in Justice Breyer’s Nicastro concurrence. 
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varied doctrinal landscape dramatically enhances the Court’s future ability to 
break the persistent analytical deadlock that caused it to issue split decisions in 
Asahi and Nicastro. Thus, this Comment argues that lower courts should, like 
the Smith court, respond by accepting Justice Breyer’s implicit invitation to use 
the post-Nicastro interim to develop fresh jurisdictional standards because this 
is the only lower court response with the potential to assist the Court in moving 
the doctrine past Nicastro toward the announcement of a stable and uniform 
personal jurisdiction analysis. 
I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION JURISPRUDENCE AND THE STREAM OF COMMERCE 
DOCTRINE 
Part I of this Comment briefly explores the tortuous path jurisdictional 
jurisprudence has taken throughout the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first 
centuries as the Supreme Court has responded to changing social, political, and 
economic realities. A court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction represents a 
state’s power to compel individuals to respond to allegations within a 
particular judicial system.19 Historically, this power to force individuals to 
submit to adjudication in a particular state’s court was limited by the state’s 
geographical boundaries.20 However, expansions in U.S. territory and increases 
in the number of people, corporations, and products traveling across state lines 
impelled the Supreme Court to expand this traditional territorial approach to 
personal jurisdiction, resulting in a complex jurisprudential history.21 
Understanding this history provides the necessary context for this Comment’s 
analysis of lower courts’ responses to Nicastro.22 It also lays the requisite 
foundation for this Comment’s argument that Justice Breyer’s concurrence in 
Nicastro must be read as an implicit invitation to lower courts to develop 
alternative jurisdictional standards for stream of commerce cases to move the 
muddled doctrine past Nicastro and toward a stable, universal approach. 
Part I is divided into three sections. Section A provides an overview of the 
Supreme Court’s foundational case with regard to personal jurisdiction, 
Pennoyer v. Neff,23 which imposed Fourteenth Amendment due process 
 
 19 RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
QUESTIONS 21–22 (5th ed., 2008); see, e.g., McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) (“The foundation of 
jurisdiction is physical power . . . .”). 
 20 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878). 
 21 FREER & PERDUE, supra note 19, at 32–33.  
 22 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 23 95 U.S. at 722. 
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limitations on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by U.S. courts.24 Section B 
discusses International Shoe Co. v. Washington,25 which laid the foundation 
for contemporary jurisdictional law by establishing that personal jurisdiction is 
appropriate when a nonresident defendant has “certain minimum contacts with 
[the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”26 Section C examines 
the origin of the stream of commerce doctrine, as articulated in World-Wide,27 
and the muddied state of the law following the Court’s conflicting applications 
of the doctrine in Asahi.28 Because every civil procedure casebook has 
chronicled the facts of these four foundational cases, there is no need for this 
Comment to recount them in great detail; however, understanding the 
underlying rationales and holdings of these cases creates a crucial foundation 
for this Comment’s analysis in Part III. 
A. The Beginning of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Limitations on 
Personal Jurisdiction: Pennoyer v. Neff 
Pennoyer29 established the principle that jurisdiction flowed from a state’s 
territorial sovereignty and permanently inserted Fourteenth Amendment due 
process considerations into the law of personal jurisdiction.30 
The Court equated personal jurisdiction and judicial power over a 
defendant with a state’s territorial limits by explaining that a person or piece of 
property found within a state’s borders was inherently susceptible to the 
jurisdiction of that particular forum state.31 The Court restricted a state’s valid 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant to its territorial sovereignty 
and explained that a state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction was only proper in 
three circumstances: (1) when the defendant is served with process while 
 
 24 Adrian M. Tocklin, Pennoyer v. Neff: The Hidden Agenda of Stephen J. Field, 28 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 75, 95 (1997). 
 25 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 26 Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 27 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297–98 (1980). 
 28 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 29 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). 
 30 See id. at 722. 
 31 Id.; see also S. Wilson Quick, Comment, Staying Afloat in the Stream of Commerce: Goodyear, 
McIntyre, and the Ship of Personal Jurisdiction, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 547, 555 n.45 (2011) 
(explaining that Justice Field expressed the territorial power theory twice in the Court’s opinion: first, “every 
State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory,” and 
second, “no tribunal established by [a state] can extend its process beyond that territory” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
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physically present in the state’s territory, (2) when the defendant is domiciled 
in the state, or (3) when the defendant consents to the state’s exercise of 
personal jurisdiction.32  
In addition to imposing territorial limits on state courts’ exercise of 
personal jurisdiction, Pennoyer inserted due process concerns into 
jurisdictional law.33 The Court held that the Constitution required in-state 
service of process or defendant waivers for a state’s exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to be valid and enforceable.34 By 
linking the jurisdictional requirements of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to 
the Due Process Clause, Pennoyer permanently intertwined constitutional due 
process with the jurisdictional analysis of every forum in the United States.35 
Following Pennoyer, no state or federal court could enforce a judgment if the 
original issuing court lacked proper jurisdiction.36 
After Pennoyer was decided in 1878, its stringent requirements based on 
territorial sovereignty dictated personal jurisdiction analysis in American 
jurisprudence for nearly seventy years.37 The changing social, economic, and 
geographic realities of the twentieth century forced the Supreme Court to 
create legal fictions to ensure that state and federal courts’ exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants was consistent with one of the three 
proper jurisdictional circumstances38 identified by Pennoyer.39 These legal 
fictions were premised on the ideas of constructive presence and implied 
consent.40 For example, states often required a nonresident corporation to 
appoint an agent for service within the forum or declared a corporation 
“present” in a forum by virtue of its business activities in the state.41 For 
individuals, states often relied on the idea of “implied consent” to force a 
nonresident defendant to answer for certain acts she committed in a state. For 
 
 32 See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 727, 733. 
 33 Id. at 733. See Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal 
Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479, 499–500 (1987) for a discussion about why 
introducing the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment into jurisdictional analysis was 
“startling[,] . . . unnecessary and surprising.” Id. 
 34 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 721–22. 
 35 Tocklin, supra note 24, at 94, 138–39. 
 36 Id. at 138. 
 37 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 38 See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 727. 
 39 Laughlin, supra note 10, at 688.  
 40 FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 78–79 (3d ed. 1985). 
 41 Id. at 79. 
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example, in Hess v. Pawlowski,42 the Court upheld a Massachusetts statute that 
stated a nonresident’s use of Massachusetts highways constituted her implied 
consent to the state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over her for any causes 
of action arising from her use of the state’s highways.43 
The legal fictions created in the seventy years following Pennoyer 
insufficiently responded to the socioeconomic complexities of the twentieth 
century and rendered traditional notions of personal jurisdiction inane.44 This 
prompted the Court finally to adapt the law to align with a more 
technologically advanced era in International Shoe. 
B. The Foundation for Contemporary Personal Jurisdiction Law: 
International Shoe 
Decided in 1945, the Court’s holding in International Shoe laid the 
foundation for contemporary personal jurisdiction law by establishing the 
principle that jurisdiction is proper when a nonresident defendant has “certain 
minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of suit 
does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”45 
The case arose from the State of Washington’s attempt to enforce the state 
labor code against a nonresident defendant.46 The defendant employed thirteen 
salesmen in Washington who were paid on commission, met with prospective 
customers in hotels, and rented space for advertisements.47 The defendant 
argued that Washington had no jurisdictional basis for haling it into 
Washington’s court system because the defendant was not physically present 
in the state.48 
The Court rejected the argument that the defendant lacked physical 
presence in the forum by explaining “the terms ‘present’ or ‘presence’ are used 
merely to symbolize those activities of the [defendant] corporation’s agent 
within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands 
of due process.”49 Thus, the Court adopted a new, two-part test for establishing 
 
 42 274 U.S. 352 (1927). 
 43 Id. at 356–57. 
 44 See Quick, supra note 31, at 556.  
 45 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 
463 (1940)).  
 46 Id. at 313–14. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 311–12. 
 49 Id. at 316–17. 
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personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant: (1) the defendant must have 
sufficient “minimum contacts” with the forum such that (2) the exercise of 
jurisdiction comports with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.”50 The Court held that because the State of Washington’s cause of 
action arose out of the defendant’s activities in the state, it was reasonable for 
the state to assert personal jurisdiction over the corporation.51 
International Shoe eliminated courts’ use of legal fictions that focused on 
where notice was served and the need to create methods of establishing 
implied consent.52 Instead, it required courts to begin analyzing a nonresident’s 
conduct toward and within a forum to determine whether a defendant’s 
contacts with the state made it “reasonable . . . to require the corporation [or 
individual] to defend the particular suit which [was] brought there.”53 
Since its decision in International Shoe, the Court has developed several 
tests to determine if a defendant has established minimum contacts in a forum 
state: 
(1) whether the defendant “purposefully direct[s] his activities at 
residents of the forum and [whether] the litigation results from 
alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities”; (2) 
whether the defendant “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the 
benefits and protections of its laws”; and (3) whether a “defendant’s 
conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should 
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”54 
After determining that a nonresident defendant has established sufficient 
minimum contacts in a forum state, courts must separately determine whether 
the proposed exercise of personal jurisdiction would comport with traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice. To make this separate 
determination, the Court in Burger King v. Rudzewicz 55 listed five factors for 
consideration: (1) “the burden on the defendant,” (2) the forum state’s interest 
in adjudication, (3) “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and 
effective relief,” (4) “the [national] judicial system’s interest in obtaining the 
 
 50 Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 51 Id. at 320. 
 52 Laughlin, supra note 10, at 690–91. 
 53 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317. 
 54 Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonara to Fair Play and Substantial Justice?, 63 S.C. L. REV. 745, 752 (2012) 
(alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472–75 (1985)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 55 471 U.S. 462.  
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most efficient resolution of [the litigation],” and (5) the systemic interest in 
“furthering . . . substantive social policies.”56 
Ultimately, International Shoe’s two-part test for establishing personal 
jurisdiction “became the bedrock upon which other theories of jurisdiction 
have been built,”57 including the stream of commerce doctrine implicated by J. 
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, which will be discussed in Part II of this 
Comment.58 
C. The Muddled Stream of Commerce Doctrine: World-Wide and Asahi 
The Supreme Court originally announced the stream of commerce doctrine 
to assist in analyzing the validity of a forum state’s exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over nonresident manufacturers whose products entered the state’s 
territory through established channels of modern commerce and caused injury, 
prompting products liability suits by the state’s citizens.59 Specifically, the 
doctrine was intended to facilitate a court’s determination of whether a 
nonresident manufacturer’s actions could constitute sufficient minimum 
contacts to sustain a forum state’s assertion of personal jurisdiction.60 
The Court first announced the stream of commerce doctrine in 1980 when 
it decided World-Wide.61 In its next opportunity to explain the doctrine, 
Asahi,62 the Court issued a plurality opinion that failed to clearly define the 
amount of conduct required to establish that a nonresident manufacturer has 
sufficient minimum contacts with a forum to warrant its exercise of personal 
jurisdiction. Asahi’s lack of guidance muddled the doctrine and resulted in the 
adoption of divergent analytical approaches among lower courts63 prior to the 
Court’s decision to grant certiorari in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. 
Nicastro.64 
 
 56 Id. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 57 Quick, supra note 31, at 558.  
 58 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 59 See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 294. 
 60 See id.  
 61 Id. at 297–98. But see Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E. 2d 761, 766 (Ill. 
1961) (demonstrating that state courts applied versions of the stream of commerce doctrine prior to the Court’s 
announcement in World-Wide due to the language in state long-arm statutes). 
 62 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 63 See Laughlin, supra note 10, at 725 (detailing the differences in stream of commerce analyses among 
lower courts). 
 64 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
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Part C of this section is divided into three subsections: (1) a discussion of 
the Court’s holding and rationale in World-Wide, (2) a discussion of the 
Court’s opinions in Asahi, and (3) an examination of the muddied state of the 
stream of commerce doctrine after Asahi. 
1. The Stream of Commerce Doctrine’s Announcement: World-Wide 
The cause of action in World-Wide arose after the plaintiffs purchased an 
Audi in New York and drove it to Oklahoma, where they were involved in a 
car accident that caused the Audi to catch fire and severely burn them.65 The 
plaintiffs brought a products liability suit in Oklahoma against the 
manufacturer of the allegedly defective Audi and members of the distribution 
network.66 The regional distributor, World-Wide Volkswagen, and retail 
dealer, Seaway, were both citizens of New York, and as such, argued that 
Oklahoma could not assert personal jurisdiction over them.67 
In its analysis of the case, the Court introduced the stream of commerce 
doctrine by explaining that a forum state may constitutionally assert 
jurisdiction over a nonresident manufacturer when that manufacturer “delivers 
its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be 
purchased by consumers in the forum State.”68 According to the Court, the 
stream of commerce referred to the formal or informal distribution networks 
that manufacturers use to “serve, directly or indirectly, the market for [their] 
product[s] in other States.”69 The Court further explained 
“foreseeability . . . that [a] defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum 
State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court 
there” satisfies the constitutional requirement of minimum contacts under the 
stream of commerce doctrine.70 According to the Court, nonresident 
defendants should foresee being haled into a state’s courts if they spent effort 
to serve the forum state’s market either directly or indirectly.71 
 
 65 World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 288. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. Both defendants claimed that they did not do any business in Oklahoma, ship or sell any product to 
or in that state, have an agent to receive process there, or purchase advertisements “in any media calculated to 
reach Oklahoma.” Id. at 289. 
 68 Id. at 298. 
 69 Id. at 297.  
 70 Id. But see GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED 
STATES COURTS 95 (4th ed. 2007) (explaining that World-Wide’s foreseeability inquiry has come under 
criticism for circularity). 
 71 World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 297. 
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Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the Court found an absence of any 
circumstances to justify Oklahoma’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the 
defendants.72 Because the defendants did not attempt to sell or advertise in 
Oklahoma, the Court found that they did not make any direct or indirect efforts 
to serve the state’s market.73 Thus, the defendants could not reasonably 
anticipate being haled into Oklahoma’s courts regardless of the theoretical 
foreseeability that the plaintiffs’ car could eventually be driven into the state 
and cause injury.74 Ultimately, the Court held that it was the plaintiffs’ 
“unilateral activity,” and not the efforts of the defendants, that brought the 
allegedly defective Audi to Oklahoma, and therefore, the defendants did not 
establish sufficient contacts with Oklahoma to sustain the state’s assertion of 
jurisdiction.75 
By holding that the plaintiffs’ unilateral action could not sustain 
Oklahoma’s assertion of jurisdiction, the Court did not provide further 
guidance about the precise quality and quantity of contacts that would cause a 
nonresident defendant to reasonably anticipate being haled into a forum’s 
courts.76 Due to this lack of guidance about exactly what conduct would be 
sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, lower 
courts varied in how they applied the doctrine after its announcement in 
World-Wide.77 
When presented with the opportunity to clarify the stream of commerce 
doctrine in Asahi,78 the Court failed to issue a majority opinion. This further 
exacerbated lower courts’ confusion by thwarting the establishment of a 
uniform standard for jurisdictional analysis in stream of commerce cases.  
 
 72 Id. at 295. 
 73 Id. 
 74 See id. 
 75 Id. at 298 (quoting Hansen v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 76 See id. at 299. 
 77 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 110 (1987) (O’Connor, J., plurality 
opinion) (“Some courts have understood the Due Process Clause, as interpreted in World-Wide Volkswagen, to 
allow an exercise of personal jurisdiction to be based on no more than the defendant’s act of placing the 
product in the stream of commerce. Other courts have understood . . . World-Wide Volkswagen to require the 
action of the defendant to be more purposefully directed at the forum State than the mere act of placing a 
product in the stream of commerce.”). 
 78 See Asahi, 480 U.S. 102. 
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2. The Court’s First Failed Attempt to Clarify the Stream of Commerce 
Doctrine: Asahi 
The Supreme Court’s splintered plurality opinion in Asahi thwarted the 
establishment of a uniform jurisdictional standard in stream of commerce cases 
by announcing two competing tests for determining what constitutes a 
nonresident defendant’s establishment of sufficient minimum contacts with a 
forum state.79 The two competing tests were each supported by four Justices80: 
(1) Justice O’Connor’s stream of commerce plus test,81 and (2) Justice 
Brennan’s pure stream of commerce test.82 Because understanding the impact 
of Asahi’s competing tests is key to contextualizing the Court’s plurality 
opinion in Nicastro, this subsection will briefly discuss the case and the 
fundamental differences between the two tests it announced.83 
The cause of action in Asahi arose after the plaintiff lost control of his 
motorcycle and collided with a tractor, seriously injuring himself and killing 
his wife.84 Alleging that a defective motorcycle tire tube caused the accident, 
the plaintiff filed a products liability action in California state court against the 
Taiwanese tire tube manufacturer (Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Company)85 
and the Japanese tube valve assembly manufacturer (Asahi Metal Industry 
Company).86 The Taiwanese manufacturer subsequently filed a third-party suit 
for indemnification against the Japanese manufacturer.87 The plaintiff settled 
his claims against both foreign defendants out of court, leaving only the 
indemnification action for the California court to decide.88 The Japanese 
 
 79 Compare id. at 112 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (“The placement of a product into the stream of 
commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.”), with 
id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[J]urisdiction premised on the 
placement of a product into the stream of commerce is consistent with the Due Process Clause, and [does] not 
require[] a showing of additional conduct.”).  
 80 Justice Stevens did not endorse either of the tests articulated by Justice O’Connor and Justice Brennan. 
See id. at 121–22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Instead, he articulated a 
standard that seemingly departed from the International Shoe precedent by suggesting that jurisdictional 
analysis in stream of commerce cases should focus on the volume, value, and hazardous nature of the 
nonresident defendant’s products rather than the defendant’s “minimum contacts” with the forum. Id. at 122. 
 81 See id. at 112 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
 82 See id. at 116–17 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  
 83 See Laughlin, supra note 10, at 702, 704, for a discussion of Justice Stevens’s opinion and its limited 
impact on lower courts. 
 84 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
 85 Id. at 105–06. 
 86 Id. at 106.  
 87 Id.  
 88 Id. 
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manufacturer alleged that it did not have sufficient minimum contacts with 
California to sustain the state’s assertion of personal jurisdiction.89 
The California Supreme Court held that the Japanese manufacturer’s 
“intentional act of placing its components into the stream of commerce . . . by 
delivering the components to [the Taiwanese manufacturer]—coupled with 
[the defendant’s] awareness that some of the components would eventually 
find their way into California” satisfied the minimum contacts requirement of 
the Due Process Clause under the stream of commerce doctrine.90 The U.S. 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the California Supreme Court’s 
decision.91 
In reversing the decision, the Court held that California’s exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over the Japanese manufacturer was unconstitutional 
because it offended traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.92 
However, members of the Court disagreed about whether the defendant had 
established sufficient minimum contacts with California under the stream of 
commerce doctrine.93 Thus, Justice O’Connor and Justice Brennan wrote 
separate opinions that announced competing tests for determining whether a 
nonresident defendant has established sufficient minimum contacts with a 
forum state under the doctrine.94 
Justice O’Connor’s stream of commerce plus test required “additional 
purposeful actions directed at the forum besides simply putting a product in the 
stream of commerce with knowledge that the product would be sold in the 
forum state.”95 According to Justice O’Connor, these additional contacts must 
“indicate an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State.”96 
Evidence of additional conduct indicating this intent included “designing the 
product for the market in the forum State, advertising in the forum State, 
establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum 
 
 89 Id.  
 90 Id. at 108. 
 91 Id. at 116. 
 92 Id. The Court held that California’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Asahi would be unreasonable 
because (1) Asahi was a foreign defendant and the burden of litigating in California was great, (2) California’s 
interest in litigating the case was nonexistent, and (3) Cheng Shin did not demonstrate that it was more 
convenient to litigate against Asahi in California rather than Taiwan. Id. at 114.  
 93 Id. at 116–17 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 94 Compare id. at 112 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion), with id. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment). 
 95 Laughlin, supra note 10, at 702 (citing Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion)). 
 96 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
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State, or marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve 
as the sales agent in the forum State.”97 
Applying her stream of commerce plus test, Justice O’Connor believed the 
defendant did not establish sufficient minimum contacts with California 
because the defendant did not participate in any of the indicia of purposeful 
additional conduct listed above.98 To bolster her argument, Justice O’Connor 
explained “[the] defendant’s awareness that the stream of commerce 
may . . . sweep the product into the forum State does not convert the mere act 
of placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward 
the forum State.”99 
In contrast, Justice Brennan announced the pure stream of commerce test, 
which required no showing of additional conduct because he felt that “putting 
a product in the ‘stream of commerce’ with the knowledge that ‘the final 
product is being marketed in the forum state,’ should be sufficient to sustain 
jurisdiction in the forum where that product causes injury.”100 According to 
Justice Brennan, “[a]s long as a participant [in the regular flow of products 
from manufacture to retail sale] is aware that the final product is being 
marketed in the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a 
surprise.”101 To further elucidate his test’s underlying rationale, Justice 
Brennan explained that a defendant who places goods in the stream of 
commerce also purposefully avails itself of a forum state because it “benefits 
economically from the retail sale of the final product . . . and indirectly benefits 
from the State’s laws that regulate and facilitate commercial activity.”102 
Thus, Justice Brennan’s pure stream of commerce test would allow a court 
to find that a nonresident defendant established minimum contacts with any 
forum where its products were sold and caused injury if the defendant placed 
its products in the stream of commerce and knew that they were being 
marketed in the particular forum asserting jurisdiction.103 Applying his test, 
Justice Brennan believed the defendant established minimum contacts with 
California just by selling its tire valve assemblies to the Taiwanese 
 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 112–13. 
 99 Id. at 112. 
 100 Laughlin, supra note 10, at 701 (quoting Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment)). 
 101 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 102 Id. 
 103 See id. 
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manufacturer for use in its tire tubes with the knowledge that the Taiwanese 
manufacturer’s tire tubes were being marketed in California.104 
Asahi’s competing tests for determining the requisite minimum contacts to 
establish personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants under the stream of 
commerce doctrine provided little analytical guidance to lower courts about 
how to constitutionally resolve these cases.105 State courts and lower federal 
courts struggled with how to apply these competing tests for the next twenty-
four years without any further clarification from the Court.106 
3. The Muddied Stream of Commerce Doctrine After Asahi 
After Asahi, lower courts were split when forced to decide between the 
case’s competing tests.107 The First, Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits 
adopted Justice O’Connor’s stream of commerce plus test.108 The Fifth, 
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits adopted Justice Brennan’s pure stream of 
commerce test.109 Other circuits, such as the Second and Federal Circuits, 
declined to choose one test over the other, and instead applied both tests in 
deciding whether a nonresident defendant established sufficient contacts with a 
state to sustain jurisdiction.110 State courts were similarly divided on which test 
to apply in these cases.111 
As lawyers, judges, and law professors became increasingly dissatisfied 
with the unsettled state of the law, both of Asahi’s competing tests were 
“attacked as . . . inadequate model[s] that departed from the goals, 
constitutional underpinnings, and precedential history of personal 
jurisdiction.”112 Even the propriety of applying the fairness factors in stream of 
 
 104 Id. at 121. 
 105 See Laughlin, supra note 10, at 703–04; Kristin R. Baker, Comment, Product Liability Suits and the 
Stream of Commerce After Asahi: World-Wide Volkswagen Is Still the Answer, 35 TULSA L.J. 705, 712 
(2000). 
 106 Allen Ides, Supreme Court—October Term 2010—Foreword: A Critical Appraisal of the Supreme 
Court’s Decision in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 341, 353 (2012). 
 107 Id. 
 108 Laughlin, supra note 10, at 704. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. Courts in these jurisdictions conducted two jurisdictional analyses for each case, using both tests, 
and only upheld jurisdiction if the facts were such that both tests were satisfied. See id.  
 111 Laughlin, supra note 10, at 704 n.132. 
 112 Peter R. Bryce, Note, Whither Fairness? In Search of a Jurisdictional Test After J. McIntyre 
Machinery v. Nicastro, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2975, 2994 (2012). 
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commerce cases, which persuaded a majority of the Court in Asahi, was 
criticized.113 
This precarious state of the law persisted for nearly twenty-five years until 
it finally impelled the Court to make a second attempt at clarifying the stream 
of commerce doctrine by granting certiorari in Nicastro. Unfortunately, the 
Court failed at this second clarification attempt and again issued a plurality 
decision with three different opinions, which this Comment discusses in Part 
II. Although the Nicastro Court itself failed to bring clarity and stability to the 
doctrine, Part III of this Comment argues that lower courts must interpret 
Justice Breyer’s concurrence as implicitly inviting them to create alternative 
jurisdictional standards to assist the Court in moving the doctrine past Nicastro 
and toward a more stable approach in the future. 
II. THE COURT’S SECOND FAILED ATTEMPT TO CLARIFY THE STREAM OF 
COMMERCE DOCTRINE: J. MCINTYRE MACHINERY, LTD. V. NICASTRO 
This Part examines the Nicastro case—the Court’s most recent foray into 
the stream of commerce doctrine. Understanding Nicastro’s unique facts and 
the three separate opinions the Court produced provides essential context for 
Part III’s critical analysis of lower courts’ responses to the case and the 
argument that Justice Breyer’s concurrence must be read as an implicit 
invitation to lower courts to develop alternative jurisdictional standards. Thus, 
Part II is divided into four sections: (A) The Facts of Nicastro, (B) Justice 
Kennedy’s Plurality Opinion, (C) Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent, and (D) Justice 
Breyer’s Concurrence. 
A. The Facts of Nicastro 
The products liability cause of action in Nicastro arose after a metal-cutting 
machine severed four fingers from the plaintiff’s right hand while he was 
working at a scrap metal plant in New Jersey.114 The metal-cutting machine 
that mangled the plaintiff’s hand had been manufactured by J. McIntyre 
Machinery, Ltd. (McIntyre UK), a metal-cutting machine manufacturer 
incorporated in the United Kingdom.115 Although its principal place of 
business was in Nottingham, England, McIntyre UK heavily marketed its 
 
 113 Id. 
 114 Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am. Ltd. (Nicastro II), 987 A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. 2010), rev’d sub nom. J. 
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). The plaintiff was named Robert Nicastro. Id. 
 115 Id. 
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machines in the United States through its exclusive U.S. distributor, McIntyre 
Machinery America, Ltd. (McIntyre America), an Ohio corporation with its 
principal place of business in Ohio.116 
McIntyre UK and McIntyre America were separate corporations with no 
common ownership, although their strikingly similar names suggested 
otherwise.117 McIntyre America, however, did structure its “advertising and 
sales efforts in accordance with [McIntyre UK’s] direction and guidance 
whenever possible.”118 McIntyre UK and McIntyre America also attended 
several trade conventions, exhibitions, and conferences together throughout the 
United States.119 In fact, the plaintiff’s employer purchased the machine at 
issue in Nicastro after speaking with McIntyre UK representatives at one such 
trade convention.120 
The plaintiff filed a products liability action in 2003 against both McIntyre 
UK and McIntyre America in New Jersey superior court.121 McIntyre UK filed 
a motion to dismiss for lack for personal jurisdiction.122 The trial court granted 
McIntyre UK’s motion to dismiss, but the appellate court remanded the case 
for jurisdictional discovery.123 Following the jurisdictional discovery, the trial 
court again granted McIntyre UK’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction because McIntyre UK “d[id] not have a single contact with New 
Jersey short of the machine in question ending up in [the] state.”124 
After applying Justice O’Connor’s stream of commerce plus test, the 
appellate court reversed the trial court, once again.125 The appellate court 
explained that McIntyre UK purposefully established the distribution scheme 
that brought the machine at issue into New Jersey, which constituted sufficient 
additional conduct beyond merely placing a product in the stream of commerce 
 
 116 Id. at 577–79. 
 117 Id. at 593. 
 118 Id. at 579 (quoting a letter from McIntyre America to McIntyre UK written in January 2000) (internal 
quotation mark omitted). 
 119 See id.  
 120 Id. at 578. 
 121 Id. at 577–78. 
 122 Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd. (Nicastro I), 945 A.2d 92, 95 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008), 
aff’d, 987 A.2d 575 (N.J. 2010), rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
McIntyre America filed bankruptcy immediately after it was served. Id. 
 123 Id. at 99 n.1. 
 124 Id. at 99 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 125 Id. at 104–05. 
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to establish McIntyre UK’s minimum contacts with New Jersey and sustain the 
state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction.126 
The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, holding that 
New Jersey’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over McIntyre UK did not 
violate due process.127 In its lengthy opinion, the court noted that several courts 
had interpreted Justice O’Connor’s stream of commerce plus test as being 
satisfied “in the context of foreign manufacturers that employed national 
marketing schemes resulting in sales and injuries in the forum state.”128 The 
court explained that if a manufacturer reasonably should know its products are 
distributed through a nationwide distribution system, then it must expect to be 
subject to New Jersey’s jurisdiction if one of its defective products is sold to a 
consumer in the state, causing injury.129 
Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the facts of this case 
satisfied Justice O’Connor’s stream of commerce plus test because McIntyre 
UK knew that McIntyre America distributed its products through a nationwide 
distribution system that targeted every state in the United States, including 
New Jersey.130 Therefore, McIntyre UK must have expected that it would be 
subject to New Jersey’s jurisdiction if one of its machines was sold to a New 
Jersey consumer and caused injury in the state.131 McIntyre UK appealed the 
New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
granted certiorari in 2010.132 
B. Justice Kennedy’s Plurality Opinion 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the plurality, reversed the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s decision.133 Justice Kennedy reasoned that a forum state 
could only exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when 
that defendant engaged in conduct specifically targeting the forum state, 
thereby invoking the protections and benefits of that state’s laws.134 Thus, 
Justice Kennedy directly rejected the New Jersey Supreme Court’s holding by 
 
 126 Id.  
 127 Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd. (Nicastro II), 987 A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. 2010), rev’d sub nom. J. 
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 128 Ides, supra note 106, at 356 (citing Nicastro II, 987 A.2d at 589–90). 
 129 Nicastro II, 987 A.2d at 591–92. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010). 
 133 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2785 (2011) (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion).  
 134 See id. at 2787. 
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finding that an attempt to exploit the entire United States was not sufficient to 
establish jurisdiction in a particular state without a showing of additional 
evidence that a nonresident defendant targeted that state specifically.135 
In explaining this reasoning, Justice Kennedy stated that the plurality relied 
on International Shoe and its precedent to provide the basic framework for its 
jurisdictional analysis in Nicastro.136 Thus, Justice Kennedy first determined 
how nonresident defendants establish minimum contacts in cases implicating 
the stream of commerce doctrine by analyzing Justice Brennan’s and Justice 
O’Connor’s competing tests137 from Asahi. 
Justice Kennedy ultimately endorsed Justice O’Connor’s stream of 
commerce plus test because he felt the Court’s precedents made clear that a 
nonresident defendant’s actions—not its expectations—empowered a state’s 
courts to force the defendant to submit to jurisdiction.138 According to Justice 
Kennedy, a nonresident defendant has established sufficient minimum contacts 
with a forum only after taking specific actions to target the forum state, thereby 
rendering the pure stream of commerce test’s endorsement of personal 
jurisdiction predicated on a defendant’s mere expectation of sales in a forum 
constitutionally invalid.139 Additionally, Justice Kennedy argued that the pure 
stream of commerce test violated constitutional due process by permitting the 
exercise of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who never purposefully 
availed themselves to a specific forum.140 Justice Kennedy believed that 
permitting the exercise of personal jurisdiction over these defendants violated 
the constitutional importance of state sovereignty inherent in the theoretical 
propriety of personal jurisdiction itself.141 
In Nicastro, the plurality found that McIntyre UK never engaged in any 
additional conduct that demonstrated intent to specifically target New 
Jersey.142 Thus, the plurality held that New Jersey’s exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over McIntyre UK was constitutionally invalid.143 
 
 135 See id. at 2788. 
 136 See id. at 2787. 
 137 See supra Part I.C.2 for an in depth discussion of the competing tests announced in Asahi. 
 138 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788–89 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion). 
 139 See id. at 2789. 
 140 See id. 
 141 See id. 
 142 Id. at 2790. 
 143 Id. at 2791. Justices Breyer and Alito concurred in the judgment. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in the 
judgment); see infra Part II.D. 
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C. Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent directly contradicted the plurality’s reasoning 
and found that New Jersey’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over McIntyre 
UK did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.144 
In constructing her argument, Justice Ginsburg loosely adhered to the 
traditional two-part analytical framework for personal jurisdiction. To begin, 
she evaluated McIntyre UK’s minimum contacts with New Jersey by applying 
the traditional purposeful availment inquiry145 and contrasting the facts of 
Nicastro with the two leading cases on the stream of commerce doctrine: 
World-Wide and Asahi.146 To conclude, Justice Ginsburg analyzed whether 
New Jersey’s exercise of jurisdiction over McIntyre UK comported with 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice by engaging in an 
arguably abstract discussion147 of fundamental fairness in products liability 
cases involving injured U.S. citizens and foreign manufacturers.148 
With respect to the minimum contacts inquiry, Justice Ginsburg affirmed 
the New Jersey Supreme Court’s reasoning and opined that when a foreign 
manufacturer deliberately creates a distribution system targeting every state in 
the United States, that manufacturer purposefully avails itself of all the states 
in which its exclusive distributor sold its products.149 Justice Ginsburg 
explained that in Nicastro, McIntyre UK purposefully recruited an exclusive 
distributor to solicit business from any potential customer in all fifty states.150 
Additionally, she explained that McIntyre UK itself attended numerous 
national scrap metal recycling conventions to market its machinery to potential 
customers from across the United States.151 Justice Ginsburg argued that the 
machine at issue did not enter New Jersey “randomly or fortuitously, but as a 
result of the U.S. connections and distribution system that McIntyre UK 
deliberately arranged.”152 Thus, Justice Ginsburg found that McIntyre UK 
 
 144 See id. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 145 Id. at 2801. 
 146 Id. at 2802–03. 
 147 See Ides, supra note 106, at 385–86 (“In short, the dissent starts in a scrap metal yard and winds up in 
the faculty lounge. High-minded, but shortsighted. And what of Nicastro’s severed fingers? Well, isn’t that a 
shame.”). 
 148 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2800–01 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 149 Id. at 2801. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. at 2796. 
 152 Id. 
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established sufficient minimum contacts with New Jersey to warrant the state’s 
exercise of personal jurisdiction.153 
To bolster this finding of sufficient minimum contacts, Justice Ginsburg 
distinguished Nicastro from World-Wide and Asahi.154 She explained that 
Nicastro was dissimilar to World-Wide, because World-Wide involved regional 
distributors with restricted distribution schemes that did not include the forum 
state.155 In distinguishing Nicastro from Asahi, Justice Ginsburg explained that 
the foreign defendant in Asahi was a components manufacturer that did not 
create a distribution system in the United States to market its products.156 
Justice Ginsburg further explained that the splintered Asahi Court ultimately 
resolved the case by holding that California’s exercise of personal jurisdiction 
would violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice because 
both parties to the adjudication were foreign.157 Thus, Justice Ginsburg found 
that the plurality’s reliance on Asahi as controlling authority was “dead 
wrong.”158 
Justice Ginsburg began her discussion of fundamental fairness by posing a 
series of rhetorical questions that seemed to suggest that “litigational 
convenience” and “choice-of-law considerations” made it fair and reasonable 
to force foreign manufacturers, like McIntyre UK, to submit to jurisdiction in 
forums where their products are sold and cause injury.159 
Additionally, Justice Ginsburg asserted a general policy concern that the 
plurality’s holding allowed foreign manufacturers to escape liability in the 
United States by simply targeting the country as a whole, rather than specific 
states.160 In particular, Justice Ginsburg was concerned that the plurality’s 
holding would set an unfair precedent that placed U.S. plaintiffs at a significant 
disadvantage relative to European plaintiffs due to the European Regulation on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments, which allows 
for jurisdiction over nonresident manufacturers, like McIntyre UK, in any 
 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. at 2802–03. 
 155 Id. at 2802 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 289 (1980)). 
 156 Id. at 2802–03. 
 157 See id. at 2803. 
 158 Id.  
 159 Id. at 2800–01.  
 160 Id. at 2794–95. 
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European Union country where their products are purchased and cause 
injury.161 
Justice Ginsburg concluded her dissent by advocating for the following 
jurisdictional rule in stream of commerce cases: When “a local plaintiff [is] 
injured by the activity of a manufacturer seeking to exploit a multistate or 
global market . . . jurisdiction is appropriately exercised by courts of the place 
where the product was sold and caused injury.”162 
D. Justice Breyer’s Concurrence 
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment to reverse the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s finding of personal jurisdiction.163 However, Justice Breyer 
fundamentally disagreed with the plurality’s reasoning because he believed 
(1) the plaintiff did not prove that McIntyre UK established minimum contacts 
with New Jersey under either of the competing stream of commerce tests from 
Asahi, (2) precedents dictated that a single isolated sale could not serve as 
sufficient minimum contacts to sustain jurisdiction, and (3) the Court should 
not endorse a new standard because the case did not implicate novel 
jurisdictional issues “[un]anticipated by [the Court’s] precedents.”164 
Although Justice Breyer did not believe Nicastro necessitated the 
articulation of a modified jurisdictional standard, he acknowledged “there have 
been many recent changes in commerce and communication, many of which 
are not anticipated by [the Court’s] precedents.”165 Thus, Justice Breyer 
concluded his concurrence with a critique of both Justice Kennedy’s “strict no-
jurisdiction rule” and Justice Ginsburg’s “absolute” jurisdiction rule.166 
First, Justice Breyer argued that McIntyre UK did not establish minimum 
contacts with New Jersey under either of the competing Asahi tests.167 
Applying the stream of commerce plus test, Justice Breyer found that the 
plaintiff failed to show that McIntyre UK made any “specific effort . . . to sell 
in New Jersey” and failed to introduce a “list of potential New Jersey 
 
 161 Id. at 2803–04. 
 162 Id. at 2804. Justice Ginsburg’s jurisdictional standard seems to mirror Justice Brennan’s pure stream of 
commerce test from Asahi despite her claim that the case did not control Nicastro. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. 
v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 163 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 164 Id. at 2791–92. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. at 2793. 
 167 Id. at 2792. 
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customers who might . . . have regularly attended trade shows.”168 Applying 
the pure stream of commerce test, Justice Breyer pointedly stated that the 
plaintiff failed to show that McIntyre UK even “delivered its goods in the 
stream of commerce ‘with the expectation that they [would] be purchased’ by 
New Jersey users.”169 
Second, Justice Breyer argued that the Court has never held that a 
“single . . . sale, even if accompanied by the kind of sales effort indicated [in 
Nicastro],” could be sufficient to establish the minimum contacts required for a 
state to assert personal jurisdiction.170 To support this assessment of the 
Court’s precedents, Justice Breyer misconstrued171 World-Wide as holding that 
a “single sale” to a customer could never constitute the minimum contacts 
required for a state to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident 
defendant.172 And because Justice Breyer found that the only McIntyre UK 
product to ever enter New Jersey was the machine that caused the plaintiff’s 
injuries, that “single sale” could not constitute sufficient minimum contacts to 
sustain New Jersey’s exercise of personal jurisdiction.173 
Third, because Justice Breyer found that Nicastro could easily be resolved 
on past precedents and did not implicate novel issues arising from “modern” 
commerce (referring to the Internet), he felt that it was inappropriate for the 
Court to endorse a jurisdictional standard.174 
Finally, Justice Breyer concluded his concurrence by critiquing both Justice 
Kennedy’s and Justice Ginsburg’s endorsed standards.175 Justice Breyer 
explained that Justice Kennedy’s “strict no-jurisdiction” test’s unnecessarily 
stringent reliance on states’ territorial sovereignty and high threshold for 
proving that a defendant targeted a specific forum would cause unfair results if 
nonresident defendants could completely insulate themselves from suit simply 
 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980)). 
 170 Id. 
 171 See id. (citing World-Wide, 444 U.S. 286). Remember, the holding in World-Wide was based on the 
plaintiff’s unilateral conduct, not the fact that only a single product entered the forum. See World-Wide, 444 
U.S. at 297. 
 172 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 
297). Contra McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221–22, 224 (1957) (upholding personal jurisdiction 
over a nonresident defendant on the basis of only a single sale to a forum resident). 
 173 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2791–92 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 174 Id. (“[I]t [is] unwise to announce a rule of broad applicability without full consideration of the modern-
day consequences.”).  
 175 Id. at 2793. 
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by advertising and selling products through independent Internet176 
distributors, rather than in person.177 
Although he felt that Justice Kennedy’s jurisdictional standard was too 
narrow, Justice Breyer believed that Justice Ginsburg’s “absolute approach” 
was too broad because it would permit every state to assert jurisdiction in a 
products liability suit against any “manufacturer who [sold] its products . . . to 
a national distributor, no matter how large or small the manufacturer, no matter 
how distant the forum, and no matter how few the number of items that end up 
in the particular forum at issue.”178 Justice Breyer was concerned that this 
“absolute” jurisdictional standard may appear to be fair in cases involving a 
large manufacturer while producing fundamentally unfair results in cases 
involving a small producer, like a Kenyan coffee bean farmer,179 who sold her 
products to a distributor that sold only one package of this farmer’s coffee 
beans in a distant state using the Internet or another channel of modern 
commerce.180 
After speculating about the possible impacts of an “absolute” jurisdictional 
standard, Justice Breyer explained that he knew “too little about the range 
of . . . in-between possibilities to abandon . . . what has previously been th[e] 
Court’s less absolute approach,” which is why he ultimately chose not to 
affirmatively endorse any jurisdictional standard in Nicastro.181 
 
 176 Although the Supreme Court has never heard a case on Internet personal jurisdiction, several lower 
courts have addressed the issue, and Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 
(W.D. Pa. 1997), is “a seminal authority regarding personal jurisdiction based upon the operation of an 
Internet web site.” Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 2003). The Zippo court 
adopted a “sliding scale,” balancing “the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over 
the Internet.” Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1124. 
 177 See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. at 2794. Justice Breyer felt that “manufacturers come in many shapes and sizes” and that “[i]t may 
be fundamentally unfair to require a small Egyptian shirt maker, a Brazilian manufacturing cooperative, or a 
Kenyan coffee farmer, selling its products through international distributors, to respond to products-liability 
tort suits in virtually every State in the United States.” Id. 
 180 Id. at 2793.  
 181 Id. 
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III.  INTERPRETING JUSTICE BREYER’S CONCURRENCE AS AN IMPLICIT 
INVITATION WOULD BRING STABILITY TO THE STREAM OF COMMERCE 
DOCTRINE 
Disillusioned law professors and legal professionals alike have heavily 
criticized the Nicastro opinions for failing to clarify personal jurisdiction 
analysis in stream of commerce cases after decades of widespread 
confusion.182 At least one academic commentator has called the Nicastro 
opinions three of the most poorly reasoned opinions in Supreme Court history, 
and specifically attacked Justice Breyer’s concurrence for manipulating 
precedent to avoid endorsing a jurisdictional analysis.183 
Justice Breyer’s concurrence is particularly important due to the Marks 
Rule,184 which states that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no 
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of [a majority], the 
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members 
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”185 Thus, Justice 
Breyer’s narrow concurrence in the judgment based on existing precedent is 
the holding of Nicastro and binding on all lower courts. As such, Justice 
Breyer’s concurrence has been subjected to even harsher criticism for 
exacerbating the analytical ambiguity186 surrounding the stream of commerce 
doctrine by (1) refusing to address the decades-old jurisdictional questions 
implicated by Nicastro, (2) engaging in a hypothetical discussion about the 
novel jurisdictional challenges created by globalization and the Internet, and 
 
 182 See, e.g., Ides, supra note 106, at 371–72; Bryce, supra note 112, at 3002–04; Richard B. Koch, Jr., 
Recent Decision, A Non-Resident Defendant Is Only Subject to the Jurisdiction of a State Where That 
Defendant Displays Intentional, Forum-Directed Conduct and Purposefully Avails Him or Herself of the 
Benefits and Protections of That State’s Laws: J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 199, 
222–24 (2012); Sean Wajert, Lower Courts Grapple with Nicastro Meaning, MASS TORT DEF. (Nov. 11, 
2011), http://www.masstortdefense.com/2011/11/articles/lower-courts-grapple-with-nicastro-meaning/. But see 
Quick, supra note 44, at 606 (“To say [the Court] missed [the] opportunity [to clarify the stream of commerce 
doctrine] entirely would not give the Court its due credit . . . .”). 
 183 See Ides, supra note 106, at 345, 371–76.  
 184 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
 185 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (first alteration in original) (quoting Marks, 430 U.S. at 
193) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Adam N. Steinman, The Lay of the Land: Examining the 
Three Opinions in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 481, 514 (2012) (explaining in 
greater detail how, under the Marks Rule, Justice Breyer’s concurrence is the holding of Nicastro). 
 186 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (providing courts with at least two 
relatively concrete tests to apply despite the split decision). 
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(3) rejecting the competing stream of commerce tests without propounding a 
substitute.187 
Although these criticisms are not without merit, this Comment contends 
that they are counterproductive by preventing lower courts from effectively 
interpreting and applying Justice Breyer’s concurrence in a way that moves 
jurisdictional jurisprudence past Nicastro and beyond the confusion 
surrounding the stream of commerce doctrine. Thus, this Comment argues that 
instead of reading Justice Breyer’s concurrence as flawed with limited 
precedential value, lower courts must interpret it as implicitly inviting them to 
act as “laboratories”188 in generating alternative jurisdictional standards that 
ameliorate the analytical complications arising from a globalized economy 
while remedying the deficiencies inherent in the competing tests endorsed by 
the Nicastro plurality and dissent. Only this interpretation of the case enables 
lower courts to help move the stream of commerce doctrine toward stability by 
creating a richer doctrinal landscape. This varied landscape will provide the 
Court with a broader range of jurisdictional standards to survey the next time it 
grants certiorari in a stream of commerce case, which should equip the Court 
with the background and assurance189 needed to clearly announce a uniform 
analysis in this facet of personal jurisdiction law. 
The following section explicates this Comment’s argument and is divided 
into three sections. Section A establishes how the text and spirit of Justice 
Breyer’s concurrence implicitly invite lower courts to develop alternative 
jurisdictional approaches in stream of commerce cases by drawing on their 
comprehensive familiarity with personal jurisdiction law. 
Sections B and C critically analyze the three general patterns in which 
lower courts have responded to Nicastro: (1) mistakenly treating the plurality 
as binding, (2) factually distinguishing Nicastro and applying the competing 
 
 187 See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2791–95 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring in the 
judgment); see also Ides, supra note 106, at 371–76. 
 188 Justice Brandeis coined the phrase “states as laboratories of democracy” to support his proposition that 
a “[s]tate may . . . serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest 
of the country.” New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In 
drawing a parallel with Justice Brandeis’s reasoning, this Comment argues that Justice Breyer’s concurrence 
implicitly invites lower courts to act as laboratories to try novel jurisdictional approaches in stream of 
commerce cases that address the shortcomings of the existing tests and the challenges created by modern 
commerce. 
 189 See generally Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 615–16 (1990) (demonstrating that lower 
courts’ application of ambiguous language from past Supreme Court cases informs the Court’s analysis when 
it grants certiorari to clarify the law).  
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tests from Asahi, and (3) accepting Justice Breyer’s implicit invitation to 
develop alternative jurisdictional standards. Section B examines the first two 
response patterns, illustrating how they perpetuate the instability that has beset 
the stream of commerce doctrine since its incipiency. Understanding these two 
response patterns provides an essential context for this Comment’s analysis in 
section C. 
Section C uses Smith v. Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc.190 as a case 
study to demonstrate that lower courts can both detect and accept Justice 
Breyer’s implicit invitation to develop fresh jurisdictional standards that 
balance the competing concerns discussed in his concurrence while responding 
to the challenges created by global commerce. After evaluating the stabilizing 
implications of the case study and extrapolating this analysis to the response 
pattern more generally, section C concludes that only interpreting Nicastro as 
an implicit invitation to fashion alternative jurisdictional approaches will bring 
stability to the stream of commerce doctrine by providing the Court with a 
broader range of workable standards to consider the next time it grants 
certiorari. 
A. The Text and Spirit of the Concurrence Permit Its Interpretation as an 
Implicit Invitation 
This Part explores how Justice Breyer constructed his concurrence in such 
a way that permits lower courts to interpret the text and spirit of his opinion as 
an implicit invitation to draw on their expertise to advance alternative 
jurisdictional standards after Nicastro. Justice Breyer implicitly created this 
invitation by (1) writing a narrow opinion limiting Nicastro to its facts, (2) 
identifying the issues an alternative standard must address, and (3) stating that 
he, and the Court more generally, knew “too little” about the daily application 
of the doctrine to confidently construct this alternative standard. 
First, Justice Breyer’s concurrence strongly suggests that his concern for 
the potential injurious impact that Nicastro would have on the Court’s future 
adoption of a uniform jurisdictional standard in stream of commerce cases 
prompted him to write an exceedingly narrow opinion that essentially limited 
Nicastro to its facts. In his concurrence, Justice Breyer spent more time 
identifying the potential challenges that could arise in hypothetical cases 
involving contemporary commerce, globalization, and the Internet, than he did 
 
 190 840 F. Supp. 2d 927 (D.S.C. 2012). 
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actually analyzing the judicial resolution of Nicastro.191 As previously 
discussed, Justice Breyer resolved Nicastro by focusing almost entirely on the 
fact that the case involved only a single sale in the forum state.192 And 
according to Justice Breyer, Nicastro did not necessitate the endorsement of 
any particular jurisdictional analysis because the case could easily be resolved 
on existing precedent alone due to the fact that the Court has never upheld 
personal jurisdiction in a case involving only a single sale in the forum.193 
Based on his brief analysis of the case and narrow “single sale” discussion, 
it appears that Justice Breyer did everything he could to write an opinion that 
did not create any “new” law, essentially limiting Nicastro to its facts. Justice 
Breyer’s motive for writing such a limited opinion, in spite of the stream of 
commerce doctrine’s desperate need for clarification, can only be explained by 
his repeatedly expressed concern that Nicastro was “an unsuitable vehicle” for 
the Court to use in announcing a uniform standard because the facts of the case 
did not sufficiently implicate novel jurisdictional challenges associated with 
modern commerce.194 Justice Breyer reiterated throughout his concurrence that 
these contemporary challenges were not anticipated by the Court’s precedents, 
and therefore required careful consideration in the context of a case that 
actually implicated these concerns.195 This implied Justice Breyer believed the 
Court would alter its jurisdictional approach in a future case, and that he was 
cognizant that any law affirmatively created in Nicastro would operate as 
precedent that the Court would have to reconcile when attempting to announce 
this altered standard.196 
Thus, it can be inferred from Justice Breyer’s concern for the Court’s future 
announcement of a uniform jurisdictional standard that he deliberately 
attempted to limit Nicastro to its facts because he was worried about the 
inimical impact of prematurely endorsing an existing stream of commerce test. 
Second, Justice Breyer devoted a significant amount of time to detailing the 
issues that must be addressed by any future jurisdictional standard adopted in 
stream of commerce cases. Justice Breyer began his concurrence by 
acknowledging that global commerce, modern business practices, and 
 
 191 See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2791–94 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 192 See supra Part II.D. 
 193 See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). Contra McGee v. Int’l Life 
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221–22, 224 (1957). 
 194 See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2791–94 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 195 See id. 
 196 See id. at 2791–93. 
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specifically the Internet, have created several jurisdictional challenges that the 
Court’s precedents did not adequately anticipate.197 This frank 
acknowledgment alluded to Justice Breyer’s belief that the Court needed to 
abandon its traditional jurisdictional approach to these cases in favor of a more 
flexible standard.198 
The Nicastro concurrence’s in-depth analysis of both the pure stream of 
commerce and stream of commerce plus tests affirms this allusion that Justice 
Breyer felt the Court needed to diverge from Asahi’s rule-like tests toward a 
more flexible standard. Ultimately, Justice Breyer found that neither competing 
Asahi test possessed the capacity to resolve the full range of jurisdictional 
complications presented by modern commerce, globalization, and the 
Internet.199 Justice Breyer feared that Justice Kennedy’s strict no-jurisdiction 
rule would allow large corporations to exploit the U.S. market, but 
nevertheless circumvent liability simply by evading jurisdiction in any U.S. 
forum through the manipulation of independent distributors, and particularly 
Internet distributors like Amazon.200 
In contrast, Justice Breyer explained that the pure stream of commerce test 
endorsed by Justice Ginsburg was potentially too broad and could produce 
grossly unjust results.201 He theorized that under this “absolute” jurisdiction 
rule, small and primarily local merchants using an Internet distributor without 
the intent to sell their products in a distant state or country would nevertheless 
be subject to jurisdiction in even the most remote U.S. forum if the distributor 
sold their products there.202 Justice Breyer’s juxtaposition of the countervailing 
concerns in these competing “rules” demonstrated his desire for greater 
flexibility in a jurisdictional standard. 
Justice Breyer’s upfront acknowledgment of the problems presented by 
modern commerce and his subsequent analysis of the existing stream of 
commerce tests’ inadequacies strongly alluded to his recognition that the Court 
must adopt a divergent jurisdictional standard in the future. Additionally, this 
analysis identified a list of issues any future standard must be equipped to 
handle, including the effects of globalization, the Internet, and the dramatic 
 
 197 Id.  
 198 See id. at 2791, 2793.  
 199 See id. at 2793–94. 
 200 See id. at 2793.  
 201 See id. 
 202 See id. at 2793–94. 
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differences in sizes and motivations of manufacturers selling products in the 
United States through independent distributors.203 
Finally, and most saliently, Justice Breyer concluded his concurrence by 
expressing a desire for broader external input. He indicated that, the next time 
the Court grants certiorari in a stream of commerce case, he would like the 
Solicitor General to be involved and provide oral testimony about the impact 
issues like globalization and the Internet actually have on personal jurisdiction 
analyses in stream of commerce cases.204 Additionally, Justice Breyer stated he 
“kn[ew] too little about the range of these . . . in-between possibilities” of the 
jurisdictional concerns he raised, and therefore could neither endorse nor 
announce a standard in Nicastro.205 Thus, Justice Breyer’s concurrence 
suggested that he was willing to adopt a uniform test, but needed more 
information and assurance that the test the Court ultimately announces would 
be workable. 
While Justice Breyer, and the Court more generally, may “know too little” 
about the ambit of potential personal jurisdiction issues, lower courts have 
been forced to resolve them on a regular basis since the stream of commerce 
doctrine’s announcement in World-Wide. And it is precisely because of their 
extensive experience reconciling these conflicting issues that the spirit of 
Justice Breyer’s concurrence implied it is lower courts that are best positioned 
to develop an adequate approach to jurisdictional analyses in stream of 
commerce cases. 
By way of synthesis, Justice Breyer (1) wrote the narrowest opinion 
possible in Nicastro to avoid creating a uniform standard in stream of 
commerce cases, (2) stated that a new standard is needed, (3) found the 
competing tests from Asahi inadequate, and (4) asserted that he, and arguably 
the Court more generally, knows too little about how these personal 
jurisdiction issues manifest themselves, especially in the current global 
economy, to endorse or announce an adequate standard.206 
This Comment asserts that the combination of these elements in Justice 
Breyer’s concurrence permits lower courts to interpret both its text and spirit as 
 
 203 See id. 
 204 See id. at 2792; supra Part I.C.1–2. 
 205 See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 206 See id. at 2791–94. 
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an implicit invitation to act as laboratories207 when applying the Nicastro 
opinion. This combination—identifying the need for a new standard; providing 
the list of issues this new standard must address; and essentially requesting 
more information and assistance in developing this standard from entities, like 
lower courts, that have extensive experience navigating the jurisdictional 
complications created by the modern economy in stream of commerce cases—
implicitly invites lower courts to use the post-Nicastro interim to develop 
alternative jurisdictional standards by giving them the requisite judicial space 
to experiment without the risk of defying Supreme Court precedent. 
Now that this Comment has established that Justice Breyer’s concurrence 
can be read as an implicit invitation to lower courts, it argues that this 
interpretation is the only meaningful way to move the stream of commerce 
doctrine past Nicastro and the instability that has plagued the doctrine for over 
a quarter of a century. 
Although all parties agree that personal jurisdiction must comport with 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, the exercise of 
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in stream of commerce cases often 
depends solely on the competing Asahi tests adopted by particular U.S. forums, 
causing unpredictable and unjust results.208 And as evinced in Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence, the Court must eventually announce a uniform jurisdictional 
standard in stream of commerce cases to remedy these undesirable outcomes; 
however, neither the pure stream of commerce nor the stream of commerce 
plus test, as they stand, can muster a majority of the current Justices.209 
If lower courts continue applying these same competing Asahi tests, they 
will only perpetuate the Court’s apparent analytical deadlock. Therefore, 
reading Justice Breyer’s concurrence as an implicit invitation to fashion 
alternative jurisdictional approaches is the only lower court interpretation of 
Nicastro with the potential to force the Court to consider fresh jurisdictional 
standards, thereby providing it with the information and assurance needed to 
announce a uniform standard the next time it grants certiorari. 
 
 207 Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (“[A] single courageous State 
may . . . serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country.”). 
 208 See, e.g., Laughlin, supra note 10, at 725; Zach Vosseler, Note, A Throwback to Less Enlightened 
Practices: J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 366, 385–86 (2012), 
http://www.pennumbra.com/casenotes/5-2012/Vosseler.pdf. 
 209 See supra Part II.C. 
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However, as intimated earlier in Part III, not all lower courts have 
interpreted Nicastro as an implicit invitation to generate alternative 
jurisdictional approaches. Thus, the next section will identify and evaluate the 
other two patterns of lower court responses to Nicastro, which further 
destabilize the stream of commerce doctrine. Understanding these other 
patterns, and how they perpetuate the creation of undesirable, unpredictable, 
and unjust jurisdictional results in stream of commerce cases, provides 
essential context for this Comment’s deeper analysis of the stabilizing 
implications stemming from interpreting Justice Breyer’s concurrence as an 
implicit invitation. 
B. Critical Analysis of the Lower Court Responses to Nicastro that Further 
Destabilize the Doctrine 
Although many scholars have written articles about the theoretical 
implications of Nicastro and the ways in which the Court should have resolved 
the case,210 few have seriously analyzed how lower courts have actually 
responded to the Court’s decision.211 Thus, this Comment has identified three 
 
 210 See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer & Matthew Smith, The (Theoretical) Future of Personal Jurisdiction: Issues 
Left Open by Goodyear Dunlop Tires v. Brown and J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 617 
(2012); Oscar G. Chase & Lori Brooke Day, Re-examining New York’s Law of Personal Jurisdiction After 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown and J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 76 ALB. L. 
REV. 1009, 1010–11 (2012/2013) (focusing on Nicastro’s implications for New York’s long-arm statute); 
Donald Earl Childress III, Rethinking Legal Globalization: The Case of Transnational Personal Jurisdiction, 
54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1490 (2013) (arguing that “a U.S. court should have power to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over an alien defendant not served with process within a state’s borders when (1) the 
defendant has received constitutionally adequate notice, (2) the state has a constitutionally sufficient interest in 
applying its law . . . , and (3) the policies of other interested nations whose laws would be arguably applicable 
are given due respect and consideration and would not be adversely affected by the exercise of jurisdiction”); 
Ides, supra note 106, at 386–87; Stephen Higdon, Comment, If It Wasn’t on Purpose, Can a Court Take It 
Personally?: Untangling Asahi’s Mess that J. McIntyre Did Not, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 463, 466 (2013) 
(arguing that the appropriate purposeful availment standard accords with the Court’s prior personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence and that “horizontal federalism can anchor personal jurisdiction analysis in the twenty-first 
century”); Greg Saetrum, Note, Righting the Ship: Implications of J. McIntyre v. Nicastro and How to 
Navigate the Stream of Commerce in Its Wake, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 499, 499 (2013) (advocating “a reasonable-
commercial-expectations test, derived from World-Wide Volkswagen and Asahi and adapted for modern 
international commerce, that lower courts should utilize to navigate the stream of commerce moving 
forward”); Shane Yeargan, Note, Purpose and Intent: Seeking a More Consistent Approach to Stream of 
Commerce Personal Jurisdiction, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 543, 544 (2012) (arguing that “the focus when 
determining personal jurisdiction in a stream of commerce context should be on the intent of the defendant 
regarding the forum, which serves as a means of determining whether there is purposeful availment that 
creates the necessary minimum contacts between the forum and defendant.”). 
 211 One law review article and one law student’s note have discussed initial lower court impressions of 
Nicastro more generally. See Stravitz, supra note 54, at 760–61; Johnjerica Hodge, Note, Minimum Contacts 
in the Global Economy: A Critical Guide to J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 64 ALA. L. REV. 417, 430, 437 
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general lower court response patterns: (1) mistakenly treating the Nicastro 
plurality as binding, (2) factually distinguishing Nicastro and applying the 
competing tests from Asahi, and (3) accepting Justice Breyer’s implicit 
invitation to develop alternative jurisdictional standards. 
Although this Comment advocates for response pattern three and will 
discuss it at length in section C, understanding the implications of the other 
two response patterns creates the requisite foundation upon which this 
Comment can further construct its argument that interpreting Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence as an implicit invitation to lower courts is the only response that 
can bring stability to the stream of commerce doctrine by enabling the Court to 
move past Nicastro and toward the announcement of a uniform standard. Thus, 
the remainder of this section will be divided into two subsections, with each 
subsection discussing one of the first two response patterns identified by this 
Comment. 
1. Mistakenly Treating the Nicastro Plurality’s Standard as Binding 
Nicastro has served as the primary foundation for the holding of eleven212 
lower court stream of commerce cases in the one-and-a-half years since it was 
decided.213 Out of these eleven cases, four lower courts have mistakenly 
interpreted Nicastro to mandate the application of Justice Kennedy’s stringent 
version of the stream of commerce plus test.214 For example, in May v. Osako 
 
(2012) (arguing that Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Nicastro signals a significant future expansion in personal 
jurisdiction law). However, both relied, in part, on lower court patent/trademark infringement and breach of 
contract cases (and even a rape case). See Stravitz, supra note 54, at 760–61. In contrast, this Comment 
primarily limits itself to products liability cases, which implicate the traditional stream of commerce analysis. 
A legal blog has also been monitoring lower courts’ responses to Nicastro. See Wajert, supra note 182. 
 212 Nicastro has served as the primary foundation for the holding of only eleven lower court cases as of 
August 2013, but this number will certainly continue to grow. 
 213 Several breach of contract and patent/trademark infringement cases have discussed and even attempted 
to apply Nicastro, but these cases do not implicate the traditional stream of commerce analysis applied in 
products liability cases, which this Comment is primarily limited to. See, e.g., Harrelson v. Lee, No. 09-11714-
RGS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10988 (D. Mass. Jan. 31, 2012); RBC Bank (USA) v. Hedesh, 827 F. Supp. 2d 
525 (E.D.N.C. 2011); Furminator, Inc. v. Wahba, No. 4:10CV01941 AGF, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96695 
(E.D. Mo. Aug. 29, 2011). Contra Keranos, LLC v. Analog Devices, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-207-TJW, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 102618 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2011) (implicating the traditional stream of commerce analysis 
despite being a patent infringement case). 
 214 See Powell v. Profile Design LLC, 838 F. Supp. 2d 535 (S.D. Tex 2012) (relying heavily on the 
Nicastro plurality’s reasoning in determining that the state’s exercise of jurisdiction was improper while also 
briefly analogizing the facts of the case to the Nicastro concurrence’s “single-sale” reasoning), withdrawing in 
part 825 F. Supp. 2d 842 (S.D. Tex. 2011); Keranos, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102618; Dow Chem. Can. ULC 
v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 4th 170 (Ct. App. 2011), cert. denied sub nom. Bombardier Inc. v. Dow 
Chem. Can. ULC, 133 S. Ct. 427 (2012); May v. Osako & Co., 83 Va. Cir. 355 (Cir. Ct. 2011).  
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& Company,215 the circuit court of the city of Roanoke, Virginia, applied 
Nicastro as if it were a majority opinion that fundamentally changed the 
analysis in stream of commerce cases and required the application of Justice 
Kennedy’s version of the stream of commerce plus test.216 
Similarly, the district court in Keranos, LLC v. Analog Devices217 stated 
that Nicastro required the court to depart from Fifth Circuit precedent and 
abandon the application of the pure stream of commerce test in favor of Justice 
Kennedy’s stream of commerce plus test.218 Interestingly, the district court in 
Ainsworth v. Cargotec USA, Inc.,219 also located in the Fifth Circuit, decided 
that Nicastro did not alter the Circuit’s precedent.220 However, in recognizing 
the discord its decision created, the district court certified Ainsworth for 
interlocutory appeal, making the Fifth Circuit the first federal appellate court to 
interpret Nicastro.221 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
decision in Ainsworth that Nicastro did not alter the Circuit’s precedent by 
holding that Justice Breyer’s concurrence, not Justice Kennedy’s plurality 
opinion, was the only binding precedent from Nicastro.222 The Fifth Circuit 
then distinguished Ainsworth from Nicastro and affirmed Mississippi’s 
exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant by relying on Justice Breyer’s 
assertion that “a single isolated sale” has never been an adequate basis for 
personal jurisdiction under Supreme Court precedent and subsequently finding 
that the defendant manufacturer in Ainsworth had sold 203 forklifts in the 
jurisdiction.223 This interpretation fits squarely within the second general lower 
court response pattern identified by this Comment, which will be discussed in 
greater detail in the next section. 
 
 215 83 Va. Cir. 355. 
 216 Id. at 356. 
 217 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102618, at *32–33.  
 218 See id. 
 219 No. 2:10-CV-236-KS-MTP, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109255 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 23, 2011), denying 
reconsideration of No. 2:10-CV236-KS-MTP, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49665 (S.D. Miss. May 9, 2011), aff’d 
sub nom. Ainsworth v. Moffett Eng’g, Ltd., 716 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. 2013), cert denied, 134 S. Ct. 644 (2013). 
 220 Id. at *19. 
 221 Ainsworth v. Cargotec USA, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-236-KS-MTP, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144817 (S.D. 
Miss. Dec. 15, 2011) (certifying the case for interlocutory appeal to the Fifth Circuit). 
 222 Ainsworth, 716 F.3d at 178. 
 223 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Since Asahi, the Fifth Circuit has applied Justice Brennan’s 
pure stream of commerce test finding that “mere foreseeability or awareness [is] a constitutionally sufficient 
basis for personal jurisdiction if the defendant’s product made its way into the forum state while still in the 
stream of commerce . . . .” Id. at 177 (first alteration in original) (quoting Luv N’ Care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 
438 F.3d 465, 470 (5th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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The courts treating the Nicastro plurality’s standard as binding have gone 
astray and severely misinterpreted the case. As discussed previously, under the 
Marks Rule, Justice Breyer’s concurrence is the holding of Nicastro.224 And at 
the very least, Justice Breyer made clear that he concurred only in the 
plurality’s judgment and did not endorse Justice Kennedy’s stringent stream of 
commerce plus test.225 Thus, the plurality’s reasoning failed to garner a 
majority of the Court, and therefore, it cannot bind lower courts’ decisions. 
By mistakenly treating the Nicastro plurality’s standard as binding rather 
than interpreting Justice Breyer’s concurrence as an implicit invitation, these 
lower courts do nothing to help move the stream of commerce doctrine toward 
stability. Instead, they perpetuate the Court’s analytical deadlock by not 
attempting to develop alternative, workable standards for the Court to consider 
the next time it has the opportunity to announce a uniform jurisdictional test. 
Additionally, this response pattern further destabilizes the stream of 
commerce doctrine by continuing the creation of unpredictable and unjust 
jurisdictional results. If courts continue mistakenly treating the Nicastro 
plurality’s test as binding, the incidence of intrastate and intracircuit splits, 
similar to the Keranos/Ainsworth split in the Fifth Circuit, will increase 
exponentially. This will result in unpredictable and unjust jurisdictional 
decisions based solely on lower courts’ misguided applications of Nicastro, 
rather than on fair play and substantial justice. 
2. Factually Distinguishing Nicastro and Applying the Competing Tests 
from Asahi 
Six lower courts226 have factually distinguished their cases from Nicastro 
and proceeded to apply whichever competing test they adopted after Asahi. 
Relying heavily on the Marks Rule and Justice Breyer’s “single sale” 
discussion,227 courts like the district court in Windsor v. Spinner Industry 
 
 224 See supra Part III.A. 
 225 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2794 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
 226 Windsor v. Spinner Indus. Co., 825 F. Supp. 2d 632 (D. Md. 2011); Lindsey v. Cargotec USA, Inc., 
No. 4:09CV-00071-JHM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112781 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 29, 2011); Ainsworth, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 109255; Russell v. SNFA, 965 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011), aff’d, 987 N.E.2d 778 (Ill. 2013), 
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 295 (2013); Willemsen v. Invacare Corp., 282 P.3d 867 (Or. 2012), cert. denied sub 
nom. China Terminal & Elec. Corp. v. Willemsen, 133 S. Ct. 984 (2013); Gardner v. SPX Corp., 2012 UT App 
45, 272 P.3d 175. 
 227 Supra Part III.D. 
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Co.228 have concluded that Nicastro’s precedential value is limited to cases 
involving an identical fact pattern, “otherwise leaving the legal landscape 
untouched.”229 After factually distinguishing their cases from Nicastro by 
showing they involved more than a single sale in the forum, these six lower 
courts proceeded to apply the jurisdictional test they adopted after Asahi.230 
Factually distinguishing Nicastro and continuing to apply the competing 
tests from Asahi, rather than accepting Justice Breyer’s implicit invitation, only 
perpetuates the instability in the stream of commerce doctrine. Although this 
interpretation is not blatantly incorrect, it contradicts the Nicastro 
concurrence’s spirit by ignoring Justice Breyer’s fears about the analytical 
incapacity of the existing stream of commerce tests.231 Justice Breyer explicitly 
stated that the existing Asahi tests inadequately respond to the complications 
created by modern commerce, and by not accepting his invitation to remedy 
these inadequacies through the development of alternative jurisdictional 
approaches, these lower courts hinder the Court’s opportunity to formulate an 
adequate test in the future. 
Additionally, as illustrated by law student Zach Vosseler in his recent case 
note, the continuing split among circuits, created by courts’ divergent 
applications of the Asahi tests, does not result in the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction predicated on fair play and substantial justice.232 Instead, personal 
jurisdiction often rests solely on the particular Asahi test applied by the state or 
circuit in which the court is located, which increases unjust results and 
incentivizes undesirable forum shopping.233 
To bolster his argument, Vosseler analyzed the two post-Nicastro cases 
involving Cargotec USA, Inc., both of which involved the same foreign 
manufacturer, distributor, distribution agreement, defective forklift model, and 
Supreme Court precedent.234 Despite the nearly identical fact patterns, the 
cases resulted in opposite holdings due to the location of the courts and the 
 
 228 825 F. Supp. 2d 632. 
 229 Id. at 638. 
 230 Two courts applied the pure stream of commerce test. Ainsworth, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109255; 
Willemsen, 282 P.3d 867. The other four applied the stream of commerce plus test. Windsor, 825 F. Supp. 2d 
638; Lindsey, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112781; Russell, 965 N.E.2d 1; Gardner, 2012 UT App 45. 
 231 See supra Part III.D. 
 232 Vosseler, supra note 208. 
 233 Id. at 384. 
 234 Id. at 384–85.  
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different jurisdictional tests their circuits follow.235 As Vosseler rightly asked, 
“Where is the fair play and substantial justice in that?”236 
The lower court response patterns analyzed in subsections 1 and 2 only 
work to further destabilize the stream of commerce doctrine post Nicastro. 
Continuing to apply the old Asahi tests, under either response pattern, does not 
provide the Court with any fresh jurisdictional alternatives to consider the next 
time it grants certiorari in a case implicating the stream of commerce doctrine. 
Justice Breyer made clear that the Court needs additional information and 
reassurance that the standard it eventually adopts is a workable one. And by 
not contributing to a more varied doctrinal landscape, these courts fail to 
provide this additional information and reassurance, dramatically increasing 
the likelihood that the Court will slip into the same analytical deadlock that has 
existed since Asahi. Therefore, only interpreting Justice Breyer’s concurrence 
as an implicit invitation has the potential to move the stream of commerce 
doctrine past Nicastro and toward stability. 
C. Stabilizing the Doctrine by Accepting Justice Breyer’s Implicit Invitation: 
The Smith v. Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc. Case Study 
Only one lower court, the U.S. District Court for South Carolina, has 
accepted Justice Breyer’s implicit invitation to develop alternative 
jurisdictional standards in stream of commerce cases. This section will proceed 
by treating this court’s decision in Smith v. Teledyne Continental Motors, 
Inc.,237 as a case study to evaluate the implications of this response pattern.  
First, this section briefly reviews the facts of Smith. Second, it evaluates the 
court’s analysis of Nicastro and argues that the court accepted Justice Breyer’s 
implicit invitation by developing an alternative jurisdictional standard that 
seems to acknowledge and resolve many of the concerns raised in the Nicastro 
concurrence. Finally, this section assesses the stabilizing impact of the case 
study as it relates to this response pattern more generally, ultimately 
concluding that Smith proves lower courts can bring stability to the stream of 
commerce doctrine if they accept Justice Breyer’s implicit invitation to 
generate alternative jurisdictional standards by drawing on their breadth of 
experience in personal jurisdiction law. 
 
 235 See Lindsey, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112781, at *35 (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack 
of personal jurisdiction); Ainsworth, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109255, at *21 (upholding jurisdiction). 
 236 Vosseler, supra note 208, at 387. 
 237 840 F. Supp. 2d 927 (D.S.C. 2012). 
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1. Facts of Smith 
The cause of action in Smith arose after a husband and father of two was 
struck and killed by a single-engine airplane while he was jogging on the beach 
in Hilton Head, South Carolina, in 2010.238 The pilot, Mr. Smith, was flying 
his single-engine Teledyne aircraft along the Atlantic coast, about ten miles 
offshore, when the propeller suddenly fell into the ocean.239 While Mr. Smith 
was en route to make an emergency landing at the Hilton Head Airport, he 
crashed violently, killing the thirty-eight-year-old vacationer.240 
The widow sued the pilot,241 Teledyne (the engine manufacturer), the 
airframe manufacturer, a company that serviced the plane prior to the crash, 
and the propeller manufacturer.242 The pilot subsequently sued Teledyne for 
indemnification, and the U.S. District Court for South Carolina consolidated 
the cases.243 
Teledyne, a nonresident defendant incorporated in Delaware with its 
principal place of business in Alabama, challenged South Carolina’s exercise 
of personal jurisdiction.244 Teledyne based its challenge on a provision in 
South Carolina’s long-arm statute involving substantial revenue, the specifics 
of which are beyond the scope of this Comment.245 The court ultimately upheld 
South Carolina’s exercise of personal jurisdiction246 due in part to Teledyne’s 
substantial amount of purposeful contacts with South Carolina, including (1) 
over 400 sales directly to South Carolina purchasers in the preceding ten years, 
(2) the use of its engines in approximately one-third of general aviation 
aircrafts based in South Carolina, (3) the maintenance of a continuous 
relationship with the owners of these engines through warranty programs, (4) 
magazine advertisements in South Carolina, (5) the use of the Internet to sell 
parts for engines and other products to South Carolina customers, (6) the 
investigation of crashes in South Carolina involving airplanes containing its 
engines, and, finally, (7) contracts with at least eleven “fixed based operators” 
 
 238 Id. at 928.  
 239 Id.  
 240 Id.  
 241 Id. Yes, the pilot, Edward Smith, remarkably survived the crash. 
 242 Id. at 928–29. 
 243 Id. at 929. 
 244 Id. 
 245 Id. at 933. Teledyne did not make a constitutional challenge to personal jurisdiction. 
 246 Id. at 934.  
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located in South Carolina’s airports to actively promote the sale of Teledyne’s 
products.247 
Thus, even if Teledyne had challenged the constitutionality of South 
Carolina’s exercise of personal jurisdiction, the extent of its purposeful 
activities within South Carolina would have rendered Smith an easy case to 
resolve in favor of upholding jurisdiction, even under the Nicastro plurality’s 
stringent stream of commerce plus test.248 
However, what makes Smith such an important case is that in spite of 
Teledyne’s overwhelming contacts with South Carolina, it is the only decision 
that has accepted Justice Breyer’s implicit invitation. In doing so, the Smith 
court engaged in a detailed analysis of Supreme Court precedent and subtly 
developed a modified jurisdictional standard that seems to balance Justice 
Breyer’s competing concerns about the existing Asahi tests and respond to the 
complications created by modern commerce, including globalization, the 
Internet, and the relative sizes and intentions of manufacturers selling products 
in the United States. The court’s modified standard includes (1) a liberalized 
minimum contacts inquiry and (2) a rigorous reasonableness analysis. The 
following section evaluates the Smith court’s analysis and development of this 
modified jurisdictional standard. 
2. The Smith Court’s Alternative Jurisdictional Standard 
The Smith court commenced its opinion with an analysis of the Nicastro 
decision, acknowledging that it was “somewhat difficult to interpret because 
no single opinion was adopted by a majority of the Justices.”249 Thus, the court 
decided that to determine the appropriate jurisdictional standard to apply in 
stream of commerce cases after Nicastro, the “three opinions . . . must be 
synthesized.”250 
In synthesizing these opinions, the court found that the “common 
denominator” of at least six Justices was, to a certain extent, the “‘stream-of-
commerce plus’ rubric enunciated in an opinion by Justice O’Connor in 
 
 247 Id. at 932–33. The court did not specify whether the particular engine at issue entered the forum as the 
result of any of these contacts, but nevertheless found the connection constitutionally sufficient to sustain 
jurisdiction. Id. 
 248 See supra Part II.B for a discussion of Justice Kennedy’s stringent no-jurisdiction rule. 
 249 Smith, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 929.  
 250 Id.  
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Asahi.”251 Although the court acknowledged that defendants must make 
“deliberate decisions to market their products in the forum state,”252 it flatly 
rejected Justice Kennedy’s stringent application of the stream of commerce 
plus test based on rigid “concepts of national or state sovereignty rather than 
on foreseeability, convenience or the interests of the judicial system.”253 
Instead, the Smith court quoted the broad range of activities beyond merely 
placing a product in the stream of commerce that Justice O’Connor stated 
could support a finding of minimum contacts.254 
Interestingly, the court expanded Justice O’Connor’s minimum contacts 
analysis by acknowledging that beyond Justice O’Connor’s list of specific 
examples, neither the Asahi nor the Nicastro Court clearly delineated the 
parameters of the requisite “deliberate decisions” that nonresident defendants 
must make beyond placing their products in the stream of commerce.255 Thus, 
the court turned to the parameters identified in World-Wide and explained that 
the critical factor in determining if a defendant made the requisite “deliberate 
decisions” to support a finding of minimum contacts was whether the 
“defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that [it] 
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”256 
This combination of Justice O’Connor’s stream of commerce plus test with 
what the Smith court identified as the critical factor from World-Wide 
liberalized the court’s minimum contacts analysis by shifting the analytical 
focus from nonresident defendants’ conduct specifically within or toward the 
forum state, to any conduct that should cause the defendants to reasonably 
anticipate being haled into court. Put another way, the Smith court essentially 
developed a minimum contacts analysis that still requires a nonresident 
defendant to engage in additional conduct beyond merely placing a product in 
the stream of commerce, but evaluates that conduct in light of whether the 
defendant should have anticipated suit in the forum. 
 
 251 Id. at 929, 931. The court said it was complying with the Fourth Circuit’s precedent, but then it 
modified the traditional approach. Id. at 929. 
 252 Id. at 930 (quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (O’Connor, J., 
plurality opinion)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 253 Id. at 931 (citing J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789–90 (2011) (Kennedy, J., 
plurality opinion)). 
 254 Id. at 930.  
 255 See id.  
 256 Id. at 932 (alteration in original) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 
297 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Thus, the Smith court found a middle ground between the existing stream 
of commerce tests by still requiring nonresident defendants to engage in 
additional conduct, but broadening the range of activities that could constitute 
“additional conduct” by expanding the definition to anything that should have 
caused nonresident defendants to anticipate being haled into a forum’s courts. 
This broadened definition of additional conduct seems to suggest that a 
Brennan-like “foreseeability” of suit in a forum could transform a defendant’s 
activities into constitutionally sufficient minimum contacts. 
The overwhelming evidence of minimum contacts in Smith makes it 
difficult to appreciate the implications of the court’s subtle expansion. 
However, if this liberalized minimum contacts analysis were applied to a more 
difficult case like Nicastro, the Court could have found that McIntyre UK 
established sufficient contacts with New Jersey for two reasons: (1) McIntyre 
UK made a “deliberate decision” to hire an exclusive distributor to market 
McIntyre products across the United States and (2) this decision could have 
been construed as “additional conduct” that should have caused McIntyre UK 
to reasonably anticipate being haled into any of the fifty states it contracted to 
have its products sold in if those contractual efforts were successful. 
The Smith court’s subtle liberalization of the constitutional minimum 
contacts analysis seems to remedy Justice Breyer’s concern that the Nicastro 
plurality’s “strict no-jurisdiction rule” would unjustly enable manufacturers to 
evade any state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction by targeting the entire 
United States through contracted independent distributors, rather than directly 
engaging with individual states.257 After all, the Smith court’s analysis would 
allow for a strong argument that these deliberate contracts with independent 
distributors themselves constitute sufficient minimum contacts to sustain a 
forum’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants if their 
products were sold to forum citizens and caused injury. 
Additionally, this liberalized minimum contacts analysis seems to partially 
respond to Justice Breyer’s desire for a more flexible standard with the 
capacity to adequately evaluate cases involving nonresident defendants’ 
connections with forums through the Internet. Again, the facts of Smith weigh 
so heavily in favor of jurisdiction that it is difficult to imagine how the court’s 
analysis would apply to a case involving complicated Internet facts. However, 
despite not providing any specific guidelines for analyzing a defendant’s 
 
 257 See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2793. 
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“additional conduct” over the Internet, the Smith court’s approach seems 
flexible enough that it could be applied in an Internet case and enable the court 
to adequately consider whether the conduct was such that the defendant should 
have reasonably anticipated being haled into a particular forum’s courts. 
While the Smith court’s minimum contacts analysis seems to ameliorate 
several of Justice Breyer’s concerns related to the plurality’s strict no-
jurisdiction rule and the Internet, it also seems similar to Justice Ginsburg’s 
absolute jurisdiction rule, which Justice Breyer feared was exceedingly broad 
with the potential to cause unjust results by forcing substantially local 
manufacturers to defend in distant U.S. forums. However, the Smith court’s 
second prong of its modified jurisdictional standard, a reasonableness analysis, 
responds to this concern by explicitly considering the size and national 
presence of nonresident defendants.258 
After finding that Teledyne had sufficient minimum contacts with South 
Carolina to support the state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction, the Smith court 
applied a reasonableness analysis to ensure that the proposed exercise of 
personal jurisdiction comported with fair play and substantial justice.259 In this 
analysis, the court applied the traditional Burger King fairness factors,260 but 
placed a considerable emphasis on Teledyne’s “national presence and 
organization.”261 Due in part to Teledyne’s large size and national presence, 
the court ultimately found that South Carolina’s proposed exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over Teledyne comported with traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.262 
The Smith court’s unique emphasis on a manufacturer’s size and national 
presence seems to address concerns raised by Justice Breyer in his evaluation 
of both competing stream of commerce tests. First, this emphasis on size and 
national presence indicates a forum’s exercise of personal jurisdiction will be 
readily upheld over a large manufacturer with sufficient minimum contacts 
under the court’s liberalized test, which further alleviates Justice Breyer’s 
trepidations about large manufacturers evading liability under the plurality’s 
strict no-jurisdiction rule. 
 
 258 See Smith, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 933.  
 259 Id.  
 260 See supra text accompanying notes 55–56. 
 261 Smith, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 933. 
 262 Id.  
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Second, this marked focus on size also suggests the court could apply this 
reasonableness analysis in future cases to determine that exercising personal 
jurisdiction over substantially local, nonresident defendants without a national 
presence does not comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice. Again, the facts of Smith make it difficult to envision how the court 
would apply this reasonableness test to a case involving a small manufacturer. 
But for the sake of analysis, imagine the next case the Smith court analyzes 
involves Justice Breyer’s Kenyan coffee bean farmer,263 and this farmer sold 
her beans to a local Kenyan distributor that also sold products in the United 
States though a website. The cause of action arose after a South Carolina 
citizen purchased a single package of the Kenyan farmer’s coffee beans 
through the distributor’s website, causing the citizen to become ill. 
Under the Smith court’s liberalized minimum contacts analysis, it is 
conceivable that the Kenyan coffee bean farmer established sufficient 
minimum contacts with South Carolina by virtue of her deliberate decision to 
enter into a contractual relationship with the independent distributor to sell her 
products anywhere. The argument for personal jurisdiction under Smith’s 
minimum contacts analysis is that the Kenyan farmer knew the local distributor 
also sold products in the United States, and so the farmer should have 
reasonably anticipated being haled into any forum where her products were 
sold and caused injury—including South Carolina. 
Assuming sufficient minimum contacts were established, the court’s more 
rigorous reasonableness analysis would probably find that South Carolina’s 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over this Kenyan coffee farmer would not 
comport with fair play and substantial justice due to the small size of the 
farmer, her dearth of national presence, her lack of concerted intent to exploit 
the U.S. market, and her inability to defend in such a distant forum.264 
This differs from the result that the Nicastro dissent’s absolute jurisdiction 
rule would reach.265 Under the absolute jurisdiction rule, the Kenyan farmer’s 
small size, lack of national presence or direct intent, and monetary inability to 
defend in distant U.S. forums would not outweigh her establishment of 
sufficient minimum contacts with the forum. In fact, advocates of this absolute 
jurisdiction rule assert that defendants, regardless of size, should have 
 
 263 See supra text accompanying note 179. 
 264 See Smith, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 933. 
 265 See supra Part II.C (discussing Justice Ginsburg’s absolute jurisdiction rule). 
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insurance to cover the costs of litigating in distant forums where their products 
are sold and cause injury.266 
Although this hypothetical case contains several unknown facts and 
colorable arguments for different outcomes, it demonstrates that the Smith 
court’s reasonableness analysis directly responds to Justice Breyer’s concerns 
about the varying “shapes and sizes” of defendants and the potential unjust 
jurisdictional results in cases involving small manufacturers.267 In cases 
involving local manufacturers whose products are sold in the United States via 
distributors through globalized channels of modern commerce without these 
manufacturers’ concerted efforts to exploit the U.S. market, Justice Breyer 
posited that a forum’s exercise of personal jurisdiction may not comport with 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.268 By explicitly 
incorporating a nonresident defendant’s size and national presence into its 
reasonableness analysis, the Smith court seemed to alleviate Justice Breyer’s 
fears by creating a safety valve to prevent a forum’s unjust exercise of 
jurisdiction in cases involving substantially local defendants whose products 
were sold in distant U.S. forums through distributors purely as the result of 
globalization and the Internet. 
The defendant in the Smith case possessed so many substantial contacts 
with the forum that the district court could have easily written a simple 
opinion, stating that even under the Nicastro plurality’s strict no-jurisdiction 
rule, the forum’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant satisfied 
constitutional due process requirements. However, the Smith court insisted the 
three Nicastro opinions and past Supreme Court holdings must be thoughtfully 
synthesized and evaluated to uncover the appropriate jurisdictional standard to 
apply in stream of commerce cases post Nicastro. This Comment argues that 
the Smith court’s synthesis of Supreme Court precedent and subsequent 
modifications constituted the development of an alternative jurisdictional 
standard and an acceptance—albeit not explicit—of Justice Breyer’s invitation 
to assist the Court in bringing stability to the stream of commerce doctrine.269 
The Smith court’s alternative standard itself did not depart significantly 
from existing precedent, as the court found that the commonality underlying 
 
 266 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2801 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (defending 
a products liability action in a distant forum is “a reasonable cost of transacting business internationally”). 
 267 See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
 268 See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 269 But see Hodge, supra note 211, at 431 (stating that the Smith court merely applied its pre-Nicastro 
test). 
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the three Nicastro opinions was, at least in part, an endorsement of Justice 
O’Connor’s version of the stream of commerce plus test from Asahi.270 The 
court initially stated that this finding adhered to Fourth Circuit precedent,271 
but then made subtle modifications to the existing standard’s minimum 
contacts and reasonableness analyses throughout the remainder of the opinion. 
These modifications—a liberalized minimum contacts inquiry and more 
rigorous reasonableness analysis—seemed to effectively navigate and 
ameliorate Justice Breyer’s concerns about the inadequacies of both stream of 
commerce tests and the potential jurisdictional complications stemming from 
globalization, the Internet, and the relative sizes and marketing motivations of 
manufacturers whose products are sold in the United States.272 
3. Extrapolating the Stabilizing Implications of Smith to the Pattern of 
Accepting Justice Breyer’s Implicit Invitation 
Smith demonstrates that if lower courts accept (either implicitly or 
explicitly) Justice Breyer’s invitation to develop modified jurisdictional 
standards, they can share their wealth of experience in personal jurisdiction 
law through the creation of a more varied doctrinal landscape, thereby 
providing the Court with the information and assurance needed to stabilize the 
stream of commerce doctrine. Although the Smith court was only a single 
federal district court, it managed to thoughtfully evaluate and synthesize 
Supreme Court precedent in a way that balanced the competing concerns raised 
by Justice Breyer’s concurrence. 
The final standard the Smith court developed was an adaptation of Justice 
O’Connor’s Asahi test that addressed Justice Breyer’s concerns by liberally 
defining how to evaluate a defendant’s requisite “additional conduct” and by 
considering the size and national presence of manufacturers when determining 
if a forum’s exercise of jurisdiction would comport with traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice.273 Thus, this court’s modified standard 
balanced the competing ideologies between the existing tests and propounded 
an approach to resolve the complications created by modern commerce. 
 
 270 See supra note 251 and accompanying text. 
 271 See Smith v. Teledyne Cont’l Motors, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 927, 929 (D.S.C. 2012). 
 272 See supra notes 253–54 and accompanying text. 
 273 See supra Part III.C.2. 
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Although the Smith court’s modified standard may not be endorsed as an 
absolute solution to jurisdictional analysis in stream of commerce cases,274 the 
real value of this case lies in its significance with respect to its demonstration 
of the potential stabilizing implications that flow from lower courts accepting 
Justice Breyer’s implicit invitation more generally. 
The Smith court’s decision lends legitimacy to this Comment’s argument 
that Justice Breyer’s concurrence can be interpreted as an implicit invitation to 
lower courts. Additionally, and most importantly, Smith demonstrates that if 
lower courts accept Justice Breyer’s implicit invitation, the immediate 
implications would be the creation of a varied doctrinal landscape, rather than 
the inimical perpetuation of the Court’s ideological split that occurs when 
lower courts methodically apply the Asahi tests. A richer and more varied 
doctrinal landscape would provide the Court with a broader range of workable 
standards and information to survey the next time it grants certiorari in a 
stream of commerce case. As Justice Breyer’s concurrence indicated, this 
broader range of information and flexible jurisdictional standards would 
ameliorate the Court’s hesitancy by equipping it with the sufficient background 
and assurance it needs to announce a uniform jurisdictional approach and 
finally stabilize the stream of commerce doctrine. 
Some commentators may challenge whether the Court would actually 
survey this broader range of workable jurisdictional standards when attempting 
to clarify the law the next time it grants certiorari. However, the analysis in 
Burnham v. Superior Court directly contradicts this challenge by 
demonstrating that, at least with respect to personal jurisdiction, the Court does 
evaluate how lower courts apply its ambiguous language from past cases when 
attempting to clarify the law.275 Writing the plurality opinion in Burnham, 
Justice Scalia seemed to recognize that the majority of lower courts “still 
favored” the “time honored approach” of allowing a forum to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over an individual served while physically present in the state 
despite the ambiguous language in Shaffer v. Heitner276 that suggested an 
International Shoe minimum contacts analysis was required for every assertion 
of jurisdiction.277 Because Justice Scalia found that the “jurisdictional principle 
 
 274 See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 70, at 95 (explaining that World-Wide’s foreseeability inquiry has 
come under criticism for circularity). 
 275 495 U.S. 604, 615–16 (1990) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
 276 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
 277 See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 621–22 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion); see also id. at 631–32 (Brennan, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (considering some lower court interpretations of Shaffer). 
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is both firmly approved by tradition and still favored,” he concluded that a 
court’s exercise of jurisdiction over an individual only transiently present in 
the forum state when served did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.278 
If the Court was willing to consider lower courts’ views of personal 
jurisdiction doctrine in Burnham, it seems unlikely that it would not survey the 
alternative ways in which lower courts respond post Nicastro, especially when 
members of the Court, like Justice Breyer, have acknowledged that they know 
“too little” about the stream of commerce doctrine’s daily application to 
announce a coherent standard without some additional guidance. 
Commentators may also argue that if this Comment’s argument were 
correct, as many as fifty states and ninety-four federal districts could announce 
their own modified jurisdictional approaches, bringing even greater analytical 
confusion and instability to the stream of commerce doctrine post Nicastro. 
However, if lower courts accept Justice Breyer’s implicit invitation by 
carefully considering his concerns about global commerce and the 
inadequacies of the existing stream of commerce tests, then the substantive 
range of modified approaches lower courts develop should be fairly limited. 
And this cannot result in any greater confusion than that which already exists 
in the tumultuous subject area. 
Additionally, the more thoughtfully reasoned that lower court decisions 
like Smith are, the more likely lower courts will begin citing each other’s 
decisions. Thus, lower courts would inadvertently form a more unified 
standard, similar to the widely accepted Second Circuit approach to analyzing 
personal jurisdiction in Internet cases,279 thereby lessening some confusion in 
this area of the law even before the Supreme Court has another chance to 
clarify it. 
Regardless of which of the three response patterns lower courts follow, 
stream of commerce jurisprudence immediately following Nicastro is not 
going to be stable due to the Court’s second split decision in this area of 
personal jurisdiction law. The takeaway from this section, however, is that 
only one response pattern—accepting Justice Breyer’s implicit invitation—has 
the potential to help move the stream of commerce doctrine past Nicastro, 
toward stability. The Smith case study represents a significant step in the right 
direction, demonstrating that lower courts can detect and accept Justice 
 
 278 Id. at 621–22 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
 279 See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
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Breyer’s implicit invitation to develop alternative jurisdictional standards, 
thereby assisting the Court in bringing stability to the stream of commerce 
doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
The muddled state of the stream of commerce doctrine produces 
undesirable, unpredictable, and unjust jurisdictional results based solely on the 
location of a forum, rather than on traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice. The annual number of U.S. products liability cases 
involving nonresident defendants has grown exponentially as modern 
commerce has become increasingly globalized and interconnected, amplifying 
the desperate need for stability in the stream of commerce doctrine.280 
Bringing stability to the doctrine, however, is a feat that has always proven 
difficult for the Court. In its most recent attempt, the Nicastro Court made 
clear that it requires additional information and assurance from entities more 
familiar with the daily application of the doctrine before it can announce an 
unambiguous and uniform standard. Thus, this Comment concludes that the 
only way to bring stability to the doctrine is by interpreting Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence as an implicit invitation to lower courts to produce this additional 
information and assurance by developing alternative jurisdictional approaches 
post Nicastro. 
If the Court felt it did not have enough background or knowledge about the 
daily application of the stream of commerce doctrine to articulate an 
unambiguous standard with the capacity to respond to the demands of global 
commerce, then that task is certainly not one for this Comment either. Instead, 
this Comment merely seeks to resolve the stream of commerce doctrine’s 
instability by establishing that Justice Breyer created an implicit invitation, 
which has been overlooked by so many courts and commentators, and 
elucidating how lower courts would help stabilize the doctrine if they accepted 
it. 
The Smith court’s development of an alternative jurisdictional standard 
proves that courts can in fact detect and accept, either explicitly or implicitly, 
this invitation. Thus, this Comment concludes that lower courts must rise to the 
challenge and capitalize on this post-Nicastro opportunity to break out of the 
 
 280 See Klerman, supra note 15 and accompanying text; Andre & Velasquez, supra note 13 and 
accompanying text. 
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rigid Asahi dichotomy and develop fresh jurisdictional approaches that balance 
the competing concerns identified by Justice Breyer’s concurrence and 
ameliorate the complications associated with modern commerce. By 
developing these alternative standards, lower courts like the Smith court will 
create a richer doctrinal landscape for the Court to survey the next time it 
grants certiorari to clarify the law. Only this varied doctrinal landscape will 
provide the Court with the additional information and assurance needed to 
break its analytical deadlock and finally bring stability to the stream of 
commerce doctrine. 
Although the individual standards developed by lower courts during this 
post-Nicastro interim may not be absolute solutions to jurisdictional analysis 
under the stream of commerce doctrine, they each provide a little piece of the 
personal jurisdiction puzzle for the Court to assemble the next time it grants 
certiorari, resulting in the announcement of a uniform standard. This approach 
might not produce a dramatic change in the stream of commerce doctrine as 
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